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ANTITRUST AND TRADE ISSUES: SIMILARITIES,
DIFFERENCES, AND RELATIONSHIPS
Daniel J. Gifford*
INTRODUCTION
The recent negotiations establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO") are the latest of a series which have progressively
lowered trade barriers since the end of World War 11.1 As trade
barriers have been lowered, trade has increased, moving the world
inexorably towards the free-trade ideal where goods and services
move in response to demand.' This, of course, is the most efficient
allocation of the world's resources, and has the effect of maximizing
the world's wealth.' Within the United States, the recognized role of
the antitrust laws is to ensure that the market is free to allocate
resources in response to demand." When the market performs the
resource allocation function free from restraints imposed by private
parties, then resources are allocated efficiently and aggregate na-
tional wealth is maximized.3
Within their respective spheres, therefore, free trade and antitrust
enforcement share common goals: the efficient allocation of re-
sources. Free trade enables the world's resources to be allocated effi-
ciently in accordance with global demand,6 while antitrust law en-
sures that resources within the United States are allocated
* Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. Holy Cross
College, J.D. Harvard University, J.S.D. Columbia University.
1. Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "GATT"), opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, the major trading nations agreed
to eliminate nontariff barriers to trade, and through several rounds of subsequent negotiations
have drastically reduced tariffs. Recently, the trading nations have agreed (in the Uruguay Round
of Negotiations) to an expansion and strengthening of this trade facilitating international struc-
ture. See THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS:
THE LEGAL TEXTS (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
2. See, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 4-9 (1988).
3. See MORDECHAi E. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, A POLICY APPROACH 404 (5th
ed. 1987); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MACROECONOMICS 474-75 (13th ed.
1989).
4. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 91-92, 107-15 (1978).
5. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 474-75.
6. KREININ, supra note 3, at 404.
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efficiently in accordance with domestic demand.
The similarities between the goals of free trade and antitrust
means that some of the issues which can arise in the context of in-
ternational trade are likely to be issues which have antitrust ana-
logues or on which antitrust analysis may be able to shed light. Per-
haps an examination of these issues from the perspective of the
goals of free markets and efficient resource allocation which underlie
both articulated U.S. trade policy and the U.S. antitrust laws would
shed even further light. In this Article, I select a number of these
issues for such an examination.
American economic policy, however, is not completely explainable
solely by reference to the normal criteria used to assess short-run
productive and allocative efficiency. There are, or appear to be,
other strains running through U.S. economic policy which are
geared to protecting troubled industries and fostering and cultivat-
ing new growth industries. Some of these aspects of American pol-
icy, like the imposition of antidumping duties, are imbedded in stat-
utes and their administration has been institutionalized for decades.8
Other aspects, like the negotiation of Voluntary Restraint Agree-
ments (hereafter "VRA's"), are administered ad hoc, with little or
no statutory or other guidance.9
On the surface, governmental action to protect domestic industry
from foreign rivals conflicts with the efficiency imperatives underly-
ing the antitrust laws1" and even the articulated negotiating objec-
tives of the U.S. Trade Representative." Perhaps some of these ap-
parent contradictions could be explained or resolved under a set of
overarching policies geared to maximize national wealth over the
long run by preserving and fostering positive externalities and/or by
enhancing the efficiencies of existing investments in human capital.
7. BORK, supra note 4, at 90-115.
8. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988). For goods to be subject to an antidumping duty, they must
be sold in the United States at less than their "fair value", a value which is determined by refer-
ence to foreign market value which is statutorily defined as the greater of the price for which they
have sold in the producer's home market or their cost of production. Id. § 1677b(a), (b); Daniel J.
Gifford, Rethinking the Relationship Between Antidumping and Antitrust Laws, 6 AM. U. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 277, 297-99 (1991) [hereinafter Gifford, Rethinking].
9. Voluntary Restraint Agreements bar producers based in one nation from exporting more
than a defined amount of a specified product to another nation. For a discussion of VRAs, see
F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY 49-52 (1994).
10. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
11. The U.S. Trade Representative consistently employs the rhetoric of free trade goals. See
International Agreements: Trade Ministers to Meet in Denver for June Ministerial to Plan
FTAA, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 7 (Feb. 15, 1995).
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Yet American laws and their administration reveal no well thought
out or coherent plans for improving upon market performance
through governmental intervention.12
Rather, much governmental intervention is undertaken under the
rubric of ensuring "fair" trade but without accompanying intellec-
tual support."3 Indeed, conventional economic analysis reveals that
much of the governmental interventions provided for by statute lack
a rational basis, or at least that their official justifications are inade-
quate. 4 The antidumping laws have long been cast in terms of
"fairness": A prerequisite to a dumping determination is that goods
have been sold in the United States at less than "fair" value.1 5
Other trade laws focus on "unfairness." The Tariff Act of 1922 con-
demned unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the impor-
tation of articles into the United States. 6 The 1974 amendments to
the antidumping act imposing an additional cost-based standard 7
for dumping determinations have been explained in terms of fair-
ness.18 Fairness considerations are incorporated into the amended
section 301, the so-called "super 301."'1 The rhetoric employed in
trade negotiations has been weighted with the language of "fair-
ness." Yet, as noted, the rhetoric lacks intellectual support.
Our government officials and our representatives in the Congress
are fully aware of these contradictions. They know that the fairness
norms built into the antidumping law and into at least some other
12. See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1172-73 (1989) (discussing trade-law "fairness"). There is ground for believ-
ing that the concept of trade-law "fairness" evolved from a naive understanding of antitrust-re-
lated concepts. See Gifford, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 291-302 (discussing the legislative his-
tory of the antidumping laws and arguing for a reinterpretation of them). Thus, successive
Congresses may have premised legislation upon a "subsidy" theory of dumping, and viewed that
behavior as "unfair" because the offending firms were believed to have established cartels in their
home countries, behavior which would have constituted an antitrust violation in the United States.
Id.
14. See Wesley K. Caine, A Case for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act
of 1930, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681, 702-17 & 725 (1981) (arguing that, for the most part,
the current antidumping legislation serves dubious ends and therefore should be repealed).
15. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1673d(a)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
16. Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 943, codified in 19 U.S.C. §1337 (1988).
17. Id. § 1677b (b).
18. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7186, 7316 ("[T]he Act ... is a statute designed to free U.S. imports from unfair price discrimi-
nation practices."); see Gifford, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 300-01 (noting that the Senate Re-
port attempted to justify antidumping legislation on the ground that it remedied unfair behavior).
19. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(A) & (B)(i) (West Supp. 1995) (defining "unreasonable" in
terms of "unfair" and "inequitable").
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trade laws are empty. Yet they employ the fairness rhetoric them-
selves and rarely question the surrounding myths. This Article ar-
gues that American economic policies, as reflected in our antitrust
laws, articulated trade negotiation policies20 and in our trade laws,
are in a state of conflict and incoherence verging on institutional
schizophrenia.
I. LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DYSFUNCTIONALITY
A. Conflicting Missions and Dispersion of Authority
Many political critics have decried the fragmentation of decision-
making within the executive branch of the American government:
the assignment of conflicting responsibilities to different administra-
tors, so that what the left hand is doing is being undone by the
right.2 ' Professor Theodore J. Lowi, writing in the 1960's and
1970's, criticized the American governmental tendency to adopt
particular policies and programs often in response to interest-group
pressures and then to isolate the administration of those programs in
particular agencies or departments, uncoordinated with other pro-
grams, generally burdened with inadequate standards, and often in
disregard of the national interest as a whole. 2 Indeed, in Lowi's
view, the national interest was often left undefined just because gov-
ernment responded only to interest-group pressure. 3 This failure to
identify a national interest and serve it was the direct result of de-
parting in practice from the constitutional schema: one which as-
20. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
21. This fragmentation was institutionalized in its most extreme form in the so-called "indepen-
dent" regulatory agencies, bodies which as a group were once referred to as the "fourth branch"
of the U.S. government. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMIT-
TEE WITH STUDIES OF ADMIN. MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 32, 40 (1937). Louis
Hector, a former chairman of one of these independent agencies, writing in the era of transporta-
tion regulation, pointed out how his agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board, was acting in conflict
with another agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission. Louis J. Hector, Problems of the
CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 949-53 (1960). The Board
was authorizing government-subsidized air service to middle-size cities in order to offset the loss of
passenger rail service which was being terminated by the Interstate Commerce Commission to
relieve financial pressure on the railroads. Id. at 949. In a famous memo to President Eisenhower,
Hector lamented these uncoordinated transportation policies which cried out for reconciliation. Id.
at 931-32. Yet until deregulation intervened, these conflicting policies continued. Recently, Diane
Wood has expressed concern about the fragmentation of antitrust law enforcement. Diane P.
Wood, United States Antitrust Law in the Global Market, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 409,
411-21 (1994).
22. THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979).
23. See id. at 58-61 (discussing the defects of the "pluralist" model of government).
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sumed that Congress would provide coherent national policies and
which allocated administering authority to a unitary executive.2"
More recently, some of the writers in the critical legal studies
movement have argued that legal methodology often facilitates the
suppression or denial of policy contradictions which society does not
wish to confront.28 United States economic policies fit this vision.
On the one hand, our antitrust laws embody efficiency goals.2 6 On
the other hand, antidumping and other trade laws promote ineffi-
ciency.27 We cloak over the contradictions of these internally incon-
sistent policies with myths of free markets and fair trade, implicitly
asserting their coherence.
This particular policy incoherence is institutionalized by confer-
ring administrative authority upon different government agencies:
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") administers and enforces the
antitrust laws, and the Department of Commerce and the U.S. In-
ternational Trade Commission administer the trade laws. 28 How-
ever, even within the DOJ's administration of the antitrust laws,
U.S. policies are unnecessarily confused and indeterminate. 29
24. See id. at 67-91, 145, 295-313.
25. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 286-95 (1987) (examin-
ing American jurisprudence in morality terms).
26. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 623 (1975) ("[Clompetition based on efficiency is a positive value that the antitrust laws
strive to protect."); BORK, supra note 4, at 91 ("The whole task of antitrust can be summed up as
the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productively efficiency so greatly as to
produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare."); RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 18-22 (1976) (arguing that efficiency is the only goal of antitrust
law); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 24 (1984) ("The funda-
mental premise of antitrust is the ability of competitive markets to drive firms toward efficient
operation.").
27. See supra note 8 (describing "dumping" and the antidumping laws designed to restrict this
practice).
28. Dean Ronald Cass has repeatedly taken note of the different approaches to analogous issues
under the antitrust and trade laws. See generally Ronald A. Cass, Price Discrimination and Pre-
dation Analysis in Antitrust and International Trade: A Comment, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 877, 877
(1993) (explaining that both impose constraints on particular pricing practices, yet they are as-
sessed differently); Ronald A. Cass, Trade Subsidy Law: Can A Foolish Inconsistency Be Good
Enough For Government Work?, 21 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 609, 629 (1990) ("Virtually every
aspect of trade subsidy law, to one degree or another, is at odds with efficiency-based interpreta-
tions of antitrust law."). Clyde Prestowitz has argued that even the formulation of negotiating
positions may be hampered by the dispersion of responsibility. See generally CLYDE V.
PRESTOWITZ, JR., TRADING PLACES 423-28 (2d ed. 1989) (commenting about Reagan period trade
negotiations).
29. See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text (arguing that U.S. economic policies are
incoherent).
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B. Mythmaking and its Results
A good deal of the incoherence and contradictions in U.S. eco-
nomic policies result from the pervasiveness of several myths and
from the reluctance of policymakers to undertake appropriate
demythologization. Here I employ the term myth in its classic sense.
That is a myth, while not literally true, is not a falsehood. Rather a
myth embodies a profound truth, but conveys that truth symboli-
cally and emotively. 0
The myths shrouding U.S. economic policies are grounded in the
truth that free markets maximize a society's wealth by providing for
the efficient allocation of its resources" and that free trade maxi-
mizes global wealth.32 Economists understand the social value of
free markets to reside in the efficient use of social resources.33 By
efficiently employing social resources, free markets maximize na-
tional wealth. Free trade carries the concept of a national market to
a global scale and thus maximizes the wealth of the world. These
powerful attributes of free markets and free trade become mytholo-
gized, however, when their operational characteristics are sup-
pressed in an exclusive focus upon their general results. Thus, the
same economic theory which explains free markets and free trade
also identifies concepts such as public goods,3 free-rider problems, 85
information scarcity,86 externalities3 7 and strategic behavior 8 which
30. See MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTHS, DREAMS AND MYSTERIES 23-25 (1960) (describing myth as
conveying that which is accepted as true but nonliterally).
31. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4 at 91-92, 107-15.
32. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
34. Public goods are those which may be consumed by many persons without diminishing the
amount available for others. See ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRO-
DUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION AND CONTROL 122-24 (2d ed. 1977). The classic exam-
ple of a public good is a light house. Highways and national defense are also public goods.
35. Free riders are those who take advantage of another's provision of a service or public good,
without contributing proportionately to the provision of that service or public good. A common
instance of a free-rider problem occurs in distribution, where one dealer who does not provide
customer services is able to undercut a rival dealer who does provide such customer services. The
former does not incur the cost of providing services but uses the services provided by the other
dealer to make its sales. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 149.
36. Information is a scarce commodity and therefore involves costs in its collection. See Alchian
& Allen, supra note 34, at 110-11. Since the classic assumptions underlying perfect competition
include fully informed buyers and sellers, the model of perfect competition needs to be adjusted to
take account of information scarcity. See WILLIAM S. VICKREY, MICROSTATICS 96 (1964).
37. An externality arises when benefits or costs of use are not captured by property rights. As a
result the market does not reflect their existence. In the absence of regulation, the air pollution
engendered by a coal-fired generating industrial plant is a cost thrust on adjacent landowners
which does not appear on the firm's books and which, as a result, the firm has no incentive to
1054 [Vol. 44:1049
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describe significant problematic aspects of laissez-faire markets.
Also cloaking U.S. economic policies are myths connected with
"fairness" in international trade.-" These myths are grounded in the
widely accepted belief that business behavior which departs from
free-market norms is "unfair."'40 That is, it is unfair to enter into a
cartel"1 or to corner the market on supply of any good.42 Much of
United States trade law is publicly justified on "fairness" grounds. 43
This justification thus carries over, the emotive connotations of anti-
trust concerns into the trading area: an area where the "fairness"
concept is perversely employed as a prop for protectionist and an-
ticompetitive policies.
These myths at times are actively employed to justify contradic-
tory programs and their administration to the public.44 Worse, these
control. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 44-45.
38. Strategic behavior involves action in a dynamic setting: The general concept concerns ac-
tion taken in one period which has consequences in a later period. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Anti-
trust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 260-64 (1985).
39. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the "fairness" of trade laws).
40. See, e.g., ROBERT E. HUDEC, in GATT RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF TRADE MEASURES
AGAINST FOREIGN ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICES HARMONIZATION AND FAIR TRADE: PREREQUI-
SITES FOR FREE TRADE (forthcoming); David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law
and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7, 94 ("Even slight differences in 'acceptance of basic free-market
economy principles' can result in 'situations that are considered unfair ....' ") (citation omitted);
see also Gifford, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 285 (explaining that the Clayton Act originally
focused on price discrimination likely to produce injury to competition).
41. A cartel involves an agreement by the members of an industry to restrict production and to
raise price. DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 9 (1959).
42. The phrase "to corner the market" means to obtain control over the supply of a particular
good or service. See, e.g., Minpeco S.A. v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., 832 F.2d 739, 740 (2d Cir.
1987) (employing that phrase to refer to the alleged attempt by the Hunt brothers to obtain
control over the supply of silver).
43. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 13 and accompanying text (referring to "fairness" in trade
law).
44. See Export Promotion Law Would Complement Omnibus Trade Act, Senate Panel Told, 7
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 759 (May 30, 1990) (quoting Nancie Johnson, spokeswoman
for the Chemical Manufacturer's Association as stating that the U.S. has contradictory export
policies which promote export opportunities in some situations, and inhibit commerce through the
use of export controls in others); Industry Leader Sees FTAs, Unified Markets Helping GATT
Efforts to End Trade Barriers, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 860 (June 8, 1988) ("We
ourselves are often caught up in the maelstrom of the contradictory goals of national agriculture
policies between the Scylla of high support prices to maintain farm incomes, and the Charybdis of
cheap import prices of competing goods benefiting from export subsidies.") (quoting Paul Jolles,
chairman of the board of Nestle Corporation); Justice Department's Rule Sees Contradiction in
Objectives of Antitrust Law and Trade Law, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 1988 (Feb. 10,
1988) (quoting Assistant Attorney General Charles F. Rule as stating that the objectives of U.S.
antitrust policy are contradictory to trade law); Franklin L. Lavin, The Sound of One Hand Clap-
ping, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 1994, at 23 (reporting on the contradictory approaches the U.S. took
toward Japanese trade policy).
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myths are, and have been, acted upon by the Congress in legislat-
ing.45 At their most pernicious level, often otherwise well-inten-
tioned officials hide behind them, avoiding their moral obligation to
account to the public for their use of power, power which they hold
in trust for the public. This Article examines several sets of official
actions which have been taken and asks whether the officially ar-
ticulated policy positions of the United States government are prima
facie rational ones, and asks how either those policies or their justifi-
cations could be improved.
Many of the particular issues which I explore below have engen-
dered friction, in varying degrees, between the United States and its
trading partners, particularly Japan.46 This Article examines the
dispute about the vertical keiretsu in auto parts procurement;47 the
new theory of comparative advantage bestowed by government ac-
tion;48 the relation between free markets and industrial policy;49
VRA's;5° and the antidumping laws and their administration. 5 1
II. THE DISPUTE OVER AUTO PARTS: TRADE ISSUES VIEWED
FROM AN ANTITRUST PERSPECTIVE
In trade negotiations between the United States and Japan, the
access of foreign suppliers to the Japanese market for auto parts has
been a source of controversy.52 American companies sell auto parts
not only to North American customers, but to European customers
as well.53 Yet their success in selling to Japanese buyers has been
45. See supra note 44 (referring to contradictory economic laws and policies).
46. See, e.g., infra notes 52-114 and accompanying text (discussing trade disputes between the
U.S. and Japan).
47. See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text (discussing trade disputes involving auto
parts from an economic perspective).
48. See infra notes 124-57 and accompanying text (discussing new trade theory and U.S. eco-
nomic policy).
49. See infra notes 158-242 and accompanying text (discussing industrial policy and
protectionism).
50. See infra notes 225-77 and accompanying text (discussing the use of VRA's); see also infra
notes 253-56 (connecting the VRA problem with avoidance of responsibility by U.S.
policymakers).
51. See infra notes 278-302 and accompanying text (describing antidumping laws and related
issues).
52. See Announcement on U.S. - Japan Auto Trade Agreement by Japanese Trade Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto and USTR Mickey Kantor, June 29, 1995, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 27
(July 5, 1995).
53. Cf. U.S., Japan to Resume Talks on Automotive Trade Issues, 12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 2, at 47 (Jan. 1995) (reporting that foreign import penetration of auto parts in Europe's
major markets ranges from 60 percent in Great Britain to 16 percent in Italy). Total foreign
1056 [Vol. 44:1049
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more limited.5
The difficulties encountered by American producers is explaina-
ble, in substantial part, by the so-called (vertical) keiretsu relation-
ships between Japanese final product producers and their suppliers.
Generally, final product producers have developed long-term rela-
tionships with suppliers which give rise to expectations on the part
of both the final product producer and its suppliers that the former
will continue to obtain its parts from these suppliers. 5 These rela-
tionships are more complex than this outline might suggest, because
there are usually several tiers of suppliers and because the suppliers
themselves maintain relationships with their own suppliers.56
The question then arises whether these vertical keiretsu relation-
ships constitute private restraints which effectively nullify the Japa-
nese government's commitment under the GATT 57 to abolish non-
tariff trade barriers.5 8 The American negotiating position has taken
this approach. It fails, however, when subjected to an efficiency
analysis. An officially erected non-tariff trade barrier excludes effi-
cient foreign sellers and protects inefficient domestic ones. Contrac-
tual, customary and other private arrangements are objectionable as
replicating a government non-tariff trade barrier only when they
shelter inefficiency. Thus, when a high-cost firm cannot meet the
prices of lower-cost rivals in a particular market, we do not speak of
that firm as being excluded or barred from the market.5 9 Its failure
penetration in Japan's auto parts market was just under three percent. Id.
54. See Commerce Study Shows Japanese Auto Parts Market is Unfavorable for U.S. Compa-
nies, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1159 (July 31, 1991) (reporting that a recent study
found that the Japanese auto parts market was all but closed to U.S. auto parts suppliers).
55. A vertical keiretsu is a vertical network in which manufacturers purchase from suppliers
with whom they maintain long-term business relationships. Ties between the firms are often rein-
forced through the cross-holding of shares. See TAKATOSHI ITO, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 178
(1992).
56. See Wayne M. Gazur, The Forgotten Link: "Control" in Section 482, 15 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 1, 52-54 (1994) (describing the several layers constituting vertical keiretsu).
57. See GATT, supra note 1, Art. XXIII (dealing with the nullification or impairment of the
benefits provided under the GATT to a contracting party by reason of actions taken by another
contracting party).
58. Under GATT, the participating nations have agreed to abolish nontariff trade barriers. See
GATT, supra note 1, Art. XI (general elimination of quantative restrictions); see KENNETH W.
DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 19 (1970) (discussing
the philosophy of the GATT to replace nontariff barriers with tariffs).
59. An entry barrier has been defined as "a cost of producing [at some or every rate of output]
which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already
in the industry." GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968). Thus, if pro-
spective entrants face precisely the same costs that incumbents face but still find entry into a
market unprofitable, it is inaccurate to refer to them as being "excluded" from the market. Id.
1995] 1057
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to participate is the result only of its own inefficiency. Similarly,
non-keiretsu firms (including American and other foreign firms) are
not illegitimately excluded from sales to keiretsu producers unless
that exclusion is inefficient. 60
American antitrust law has incorporated an efficiency analysis
into its treatment of vertical relationships." This result, however, is
the culmination of a development which took many decades to reach
fruition. The potential of vertical relationships to engender efficien-
cies has been recognized since the immediate post World War II
period.62 In the older cases, however, more attention was given to
the perceived potential of vertical relationships to "foreclose" or to
exclude sellers or buyers from potential markets.63 Thus in 1949, the
Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co. v. United States," expressed
concern that exclusive supply contracts between the major oil com-
panies and their independent retailer customers foreclosed new en-
trants from a "substantial share" of the market for their product.6"
Even then, however, the Court recognized the potential efficiencies
that such vertical relationships might produce.66 While formally re-
iterating that approach twelve years later in Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co.,6  the Court employed a more sophisticated rele-
vant-market analysis to facilitate vertically efficient arrangements. 68
By 1974, the Court had explicitly acknowledged (albeit in dicta) the
efficiency benefits of long-term vertical relationships in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp.69
60. Many business arrangements involving refusals to deal are efficient - they enable the
participating firms to operate at a lower cost. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v.
Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 295-96 (1985) (recognizing efficiencies of coop-
erative behavior and need to control membership in cooperative arrangement). The Government
will only be concerned about arrangements that exclude others if "there is no reasonable basis
related to the efficient operation of the [business arrangement] for excluding other firms." U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, § 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 1 13,109 (Nov. 10, 1988).
61. On the incorporation of an efficiency analysis into vertical relationships generally, see Con-
tinental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). On the incorporation of an efficiency
analysis into exclusive supply contracts in particular, see United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 499-500 (1974).
62. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306-07 (1949).
63. Id. at 304.
64. 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
65. Id. at 314.
66. Id. at 306-07 (recognizing the potential benefits of requirements contracts on buyers, sell-
ers, and the consuming public).
67. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
68. Id. at 330-33.
69. 415 U.S. 486, 499-500 (1974) (recognizing the benefits of long-term requirements contracts
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During this period, economists generally have come increasingly
to appreciate the benefits of vertical relationships." Perhaps the
most prominent economist in this area is Oliver Williamson. His
1975 book Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Impli-
cations71 points out that the choice of a business organization
whether to produce an input in-house or to purchase it from outside
suppliers depends upon which route involves the lesser overall
costs. 7 Economists today generally agree that the choice of how and
where to obtain inputs is one that is driven by considerations of cost
minimization. 73
This potential of vertical relationships to produce efficiencies was
recognized in the Justice Department's now-withdrawn vertical re-
straints guidelines. 74 Even there, however, the Department contin-
ued to employ a version of the foreclosure analysis. 75 The expressed
concern was that if vertical integration were extensive, potential en-
trants at either the input or customer levels would be compelled to
with suppliers in the utility industry).
70. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 408-23 (1985)
(describing the economic benefits of vertical integration and concluding that caselaw concerns over
foreclosure are misplaced).
71. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS (1975).
72. Id. at 8-9.
73. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger
Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 566 ("[Flirms can be assumed to minimize cost in their selection
of inputs."); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey Finci, The Individual Coercion Doctrine and Tying Ar-
rangements: An Economic Analysis, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 553 (1983) ("Firms can be relied
upon to select that combination of inputs which minimizes the cost of production and thereby
maximizes profit.").
74. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Vertical Restraints Guidelines § 4.2 (Jan. 23, 1985), reprinted in 4
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 113,105 [hereinafter Vertical Restraints Guidelines] (withdrawn 1993)
(explicitly stating that there are some cases where the evidence shows that vertical restraints often
serve an efficient and procompetitive purpose).
75. Foreclosure is viewed as a barrier to entry. Id. § 3.22 & n.22. The foreclosure analysis is
explained as follows:
It is . . . possible that vertical restraints - particularly, exclusive dealing - may
have the effect of excluding rivals by prohibitively raising either their cost of a vital
input or their cost of distribution. For example, in the case of exclusive dealing, a
supplier (or group of suppliers acting independently) may require that its dealers not
deal in the goods of competing suppliers. This would force rival suppliers either to
secure alternative independent dealer outlets or to integrate vertically into distribu-
tion. If these two alternatives are much more costly than dealing with the "fore-
closed" dealers would have been, rivals of the supplier may be prevented from enter-
ing the market or from expanding output, or may be forced to exit the market.
Id. § 3.22; see also Roger D. Blair & Jeffery L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopoly, 76
CORNELL L. REV. 297, 329 (1991) (stating that the primary opposition to vertical mergers stems
from the threat of market foreclosure).
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enter simultaneously at the other level as well for want of a cus-
tomer or supply base, thus raising the costs of entry.76 An undue
focus upon vertical foreclosure, however, tends to obscure the fact
that extensive vertical integration itself may be a sign that signifi-
cant efficiencies are attainable through integration. Antitrust tests
keyed to the degree of vertical integration in an industry (such as
those of the caselaw and the former guidelines)," therefore, must be
employed with caution, lest they deter the very efficiencies which
these laws are intended to foster.
The earlier focus of American antitrust law upon the potential of
vertical arrangements to foreclose suppliers from access to custom-
ers (and customers from suppliers) has shifted over time towards an
increasing attention to the efficiency effects of these arrangements.7 8
Under the earlier caselaw, the lawfulness of exclusive purchasing
contracts depended upon whether they foreclosed a "substantial
share" of the relevant market from rival suppliers.7 9 Under the ver-
tical restraints guidelines, the scope for employing exclusive vertical
arrangements lawfully was expanded: the Justice Department's ini-
tial antitrust evaluation was quantified, thus providing a more pre-
dictable safe harbor for a range of vertical arrangements.80 But even
those vertical arrangements that were subjected to more intense
scrutiny could often be justified under an efficiency rationale.81 Even
though the vertical restraints guidelines are no longer in force, effi-
ciency considerations continue to dominate the antitrust evaluations
of exclusive purchasing agreements.82
The concern of the earlier American law with foreclosure effects
of vertical contractual arrangements was not unique. European com-
petition law has manifested a similar concern with preserving access
76. Vertical Restraints Guidelines, supra note 74, § 3.22.
77. Id. §§ 4.1-4.2 (detailing the validity tests for vertical restraints).
78. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text (describing the shift in focus to recognizing
the efficiency of vertical relationships).
79. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949) (adopting a "substantial
share" standard).
80. See Vertical Restraints Guidelines, supra note 74, § 4.1 (explaining how the guidelines
made use of numerical indices (the vertical restraints index and the coverage ratio) to determine
the threshold for challenging vertical restraints).
81. Id. §§ 4.2, 4.226 (indicating that efficiency justifications for vertical restraints can validate
those restraints as lawful).
82. See, e.g., U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595 (lst Cir. 1993)
(recognizing that exclusive dealing arrangements often serve many benign purposes, such as assur-
ance of supply and reduced transaction costs).
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to suppliers and customers.83 The European Economic Commission's
block exemption for exclusive purchasing agreements, like the
American law, both recognizes the efficiencies of vertical relation-
ships and also reflects a concern with possible foreclosure effects of
extensive and long-term vertical contracts. 4 Although exclusive
purchasing agreements by producers using the purchased goods as
inputs falls outside of the block exemption,"5 considerations similar
to those contained in the block exemption are employed in the
caselaw governing these arrangements.8 6
Although American antitrust law has moved away from its earlier
primary concern with foreclosure and towards an analysis centered
on efficiency effects,8 7 this shift in emphasis has not been reflected in
the positions of the U.S. Trade Representative or other representa-
tives of the U.S. government." Indeed, the United States has chal-
lenged Japanese vertical relationships on foreclosure grounds as un-
official barriers to trade.8 9
This difference in approach between antitrust law and the position
of the Trade Representative merits attention. There would be noth-
ing surprising about a difference in policy between antitrust law and
the U.S. trade negotiating positions, if these institutions were seek-
ing different (but reconcilable) goals. Yet United States trade nego-
tiating positions are generally cast in the rhetoric of free trade and
83. Commission Regulation No. 1984/83, On the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 5, reprinted in, 2 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2733 (5), (6) & (7) (Oct. 6, 1988). These provisions emphasize the goals of
maintaining stable supply lines, and the ensuing benefits to consumers. Id.
84. Id. at 1 2733A. The provision exempts agreements:
to which only two undertakings are party and whereby one party, the reseller, agrees
with the other, the supplier, to purchase certain goods specified in the agreement for
resale only from the supplier or from a connected undertaking or from another under-
taking which the supplier has entrusted with the sale of his goods.
Id.
85. See id. (quoting the exemption).
86. See Brasserie De Haecht S.A. v. Wilkin (No. 1) (23/76) [1967] ECR 235, [1966] CMLR
26; see also Masterfoods Ltd v. HB Ice Cream Ltd., [1992] CMLR 830 (Irish High Court)
(discussing "bundle" principle).
87. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (referring to the efficiency goal of antitrust
law).
88. See. e.g., Witnesses Cite Trade Laws, Fairness in Debate Over Japan Auto Sanctions, 12
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 23 (June 7, 1995) (reporting remarks of U.S. Trade Representative
referring to exclusion of U.S. and foreign suppliers from the Japanese auto parts replacement
market).
89. See, e.g., Joint Report of the U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments
Initiative Ch. V (June 28, 1990) (discussing keiretsu relationships).
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free markets, 90 the kind of rhetoric which assumes policy goals of
productive and allocative efficiency: the same rhetoric and goals
which are appropriate to the antitrust laws. 1
The U.S. position on the Japanese keiretsu92 is that these long-
term relationships foreclose American and other foreign suppliers
from access to the Japanese customers.93 If the American trade ne-
gotiating position were in fact based upon the same efficiency princi-
ples as is the American antitrust law, then the United States Trade
Representative could draw from an idealized version of competition
policy to bolster its negotiating position. He would contend that
GATT participants were obligated to ensure that private parties did
not erect unofficial trade barriers which replaced the official govern-
ment barriers removed pursuant to GATT. The premise of such a
contention would be that GATT contemplates at least a limited
competition law protecting foreign sellers against market exclusion
by domestic cartels.
Thus, the United States Trade Representative would argue that
the foreclosure of foreign suppliers from the Japanese market as a
result of the Japanese keiretsu offended not only Japan's GATT ob-
ligations, but that the foreclosure reflected a failure of Japanese
competition policy: either the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law was too
tolerant or it was not being enforced. Indeed, he has so contended.94
And the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) resulted in a re-
newed Japanese commitment to enforce the Anti-Monopoly Law. 95
There are, however, several flaws in the assumption that a failure
to enforce the Anti-Monopoly Law accounts for the continued fore-
closure effects of the keiretsu. First, so long as the American gov-
ernment's objections to the keiretsu relationships is cast in free-mar-
ket terms, objections to keiretsu relationships have to address the
issue of whether the keiretsu are efficient. Unless that issue is ad-
90. See supra note 11 (describing U.S. negotiating positions).
91. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (describing the goals of the antitrust laws and
free-trade policies as furthering allocative efficiency).
92. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (describing the keiretsu relationships).
93. See Joint Report of the U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initia-
tive, supra note 89.
94. The United States has complained that the keiretsu problem is the result of the Japanese
Anti-Monopoly Law and the failure of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission to enforce that Law.
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 1993 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE RE-
PORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 161-63 (1993).
95. See Interim Reports of U.S. and Japanese Delegations on Talks Under Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 527, 536 (Apr. 11, 1990).
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dressed, the objections are illegitimate as stated. Second, if the
keiretsu were in fact inefficient, the problem would cure itself: Japa-
nese final product producers would be saddled with unduly high
costs as a result of their keiretsu procurement, and would be disad-
vantaged in competition in the final product markets. It is not neces-
sary under this analysis to determine whether the Japanese final
product market is open. Since Japanese producers sell abroad in
competition with foreign rivals, competition in the international
market would penalize Japanese producers who maintained ineffi-
cient keiretsu relationships.
There is a third problem with the American negotiating position.
The Bush Administration had set as a goal the sale by American
producers of $19 billion of auto parts to the Japanese automobile
industry by the end of March, 1995.96 This goal was set on the as-
sumption that at least that amount would have been sold in a mar-
ket which was not closed by official, unofficial or privately engen-
dered trade barriers.97 Yet of the $19 billion, only $4 billion were to
be imports into Japan.9 8 The remaining $15 billion was to represent
purchases by Japanese-owned factories in North America, the so-
called "transplants."'9 This targeting of the Japanese transplants for
purchases of American-produced auto parts provides a new avenue
for analysis.
Is the failure of Japanese-owned factories in the United States to
purchase American automobile parts in the quantity desired by the
U.S. government inefficient? If the Japanese transplants are procur-
ing their supplies of auto parts inefficiently, then they are, as noted
above, handicapping themselves in the American market vis-a-vis
their American, European and Korean rivals. In addition, long-term
procurement commitments from inefficient sources which, in the ag-
gregate, foreclose a significant sector from efficient producers might
violate the American antitrust laws. 00 Indeed, the Federal Trade
96. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1995 at C2; accord, Japan Automakers to Reach Target for Pro-
curement of U.S. Auto Parts, 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 4, at 166 (Jan. 25, 1995).
97. See, e.g., Prestowitz, supra note 28, at 170 (describing the process by which the U.S.
government arrived at target figures for the 1986 Semiconductor Trade Agreement).
98. See supra note 96.
99. "Transplants" are factories that Japanese automakers establish in the United States. Yuri
Kageyama, Boosting U.S. Car Sales in Japan is His Mission; Autos: Japanese Government's
Man in Detroit is Helped by Relaxed Regulations in His Homeland and Dollar's Slippage
Against the Yen. L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1995, at D9.
100. See supra notes 63-82 and accompanying text (discussing "foreclosure" and efficiency as
factors affecting the lawfulness of long-term supplier/customer agreements).
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Commission conducted an investigation into the procurement prac-
tices of the Japanese transplants. 01 Yet, the Commission closed that
investigation without taking action. 10 2 Perhaps the difficulty is tech-
nical: the keiretsu relationships are not contractual and therefore
are beyond the reach of the antitrust laws."0 3 There is ground for
believing that this rationale is unlikely: American courts have found
ways around such technical barriers before when they have believed
that conduct otherwise violated the antitrust laws. 04 A more likely
explanation is that the keiretsu relationships appear efficient and
therefore apparently compatible with overt antitrust goals.
There is, however, an entirely different analysis which might ap-
ply to the keiretsu problem. Let us assume, for purposes of analysis,
that the auto parts industry in both Japan and the United States is
imperfectly competitive. The result of this less than perfect competi-
tion is that producers earn positive profits (or monopoly rents).10 5 In
that situation, 'then, American welfare is increased when the U.S.
producers sell to foreign buyers.10 6 A policy pursued by U.S. trade
negotiators designed to expand Japanese purchases would, in the
circumstances described, thus further overall American welfare re-
gardless of whether the Japanese purchases from the American sup-
pliers were (or were not) more efficient than procuring supplies from
Japanese sources.
A similar analysis can be applied to sales by U.S. producers to
Japanese transplant operations. 07 So long as the auto parts industry
101. Japanese Auto Transplants in FTC Probe Deny Kieretsu Disadvantaging U.S. Suppliers,
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1640 (Oct. 31 1990).
102. FTC Closes Investigation Into Auto Parts Industry, 12 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 1, at 26 (Jan. 4, 1995).
103. See Daniel 1. Okimoto, Regime Characteristics of Japanese Industrial Policy, in JAPAN'S
HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY 35, 58 (Hugh
Patrick, ed., 1986) (explaining that the keiretsu relationships "transcend ties of legal contract or
short term market considerations") (emphasis added).
104. For cases that employed an expansive construction of the term "combination," see Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968); Albrecht v. Herald
Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 & n.6 (1968); and United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,
43-48 (1960). In an analogous fashion, the Court ignored the formalities of the parties' legal
relationship in order to find an antitrust violation in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 18
(1964).
105. For the purposes of the argument made in the text, monopoly rents can include not only
producer profits but extranormal returns to labor as well.
106. In the situation described, U.S. welfare effect is enhanced by the resulting producer sur-
plus. In domestic sales, producer surplus reflecting monopoly rents would not enhance welfare
because it would reduce consumer surplus. In foreign sales, however, domestic welfare is enhanced
by producer surplus because there is no corresponding reduction in domestic consumer surplus.
107. See supra notes 103-07 and accompanying text (discussing issues involving the Japanese
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is sufficiently imperfectly competitive as to engender some amount
of monopoly rent,"0 8 then American welfare is almost certainly in-
creased when that rent goes to U.S. producers rather than foreign
producers. Even if the keiretsu relationship is more efficient for the
transplants as a source of supplies than the alternative American
producers, the increase in the sales of the latter will almost certainly
outweigh the lesser efficiency of the arrangement. For the results to
be otherwise, the unit profit of the American producers would have
to be less than unit efficiency loss attributable to the substitution, an
event which appears prima facie unlikely.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this sketch of U.S. anti-
trust and trade policy. First, it appears that U.S. trade policy em-
ploys the rhetoric of antitrust law, but that this rhetoric is mislead-
ing. U.S. trade policy as applied to the auto parts issue does not
incorporate the efficiency norms which have been associated with
antitrust law.109
Second, U.S. trade policy is nonetheless pursuing the national in-
terest of the United States, because it is seeking a result which is
welfare-enhancing for the United States. A disinterested observer
might conclude that the United States is pursuing conflicting poli-
cies: an antitrust policy which furthers efficiency and a trade policy
which is more indifferent to efficiency, and that U.S. officials cover
over the conflict by using antitrust and efficiency rhetoric even when
it is inapplicable. Alternatively, such an observer might conclude
that there is a latent but largely unarticulated governing U.S. policy
that controls the scope of other, subordinate policies such as those of
antitrust and trade. The governing policy is overall enhancement of
U.S. welfare. Antitrust policy pursues an efficiency goal where that
goal is U.S. welfare enhancing. Most of the time trade policy coin-
cides with (or does not conflict with) the efficiency goals underlying
antitrust policy. Under a governing norm which gives priority to the
enhancement of U.S. welfare, however, we would expect that in
those cases in which U.S. welfare would be enhanced at a small
sacrifice in efficiency, trade policy would follow the option of seeking
the enhancement of U.S. welfare. This is exactly the route that U.S.
transplants).
108. See supra notes 52-108 and accompanying text (discussing the trade dispute between the
U.S. and Japan over auto parts).
109. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. trade policy with
Japan).
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trade policy has taken on the auto parts issue. 1
The apparent consistency in this one case, however, does not sup-
port the view that the United States has adopted internally consis-
tent economic policies. Overall United States economic policies do
not exhibit any consistent concern with the enhancement of U.S.
welfare. Indeed, no official has even attempted to justify the U.S.
official negotiating position on auto parts in the manner suggested
above. Rather, the United States position is officially rationalized on
free-market grounds, grounds which appear flawed."' Moreover, the
anticompetitive results which routinely are produced by the an-
tidumping laws demonstrate that the United States frequently fol-
lows welfare-reducing policies." 2 And the policies underlying the
antidumping laws are in direct conflict with the policies underlying
the antitrust laws."' The extensive use of VRA's, as shown be-
low,"" rests upon no principle or policy which the United States
government has ever attempted to reconcile with the antitrust laws.
Thus United States economic policies are, in overall effect,
incoherent.
III. THE NEW TRADE THEORY AND U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY
The absorption of the new trade theory into United States eco-
nomic policies poses a major challenge to policymakers and one
which is fraught with the danger of further exacerbating the inco-
herence now pervading those policies. The new trade theory is pre-
mised upon the belief that, contrary to the traditional theory, com-
parative advantage is not necessarily a result of chance or historical
110. See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. trade policy with
Japan).
S111. The free-market rationale for the U.S. auto parts position appears flawed because a major
objective of the U.S. policy involves the purchases of transplants. Were inefficient market re-
straints blocking access of U.S. suppliers to the transplants, the FTC would not have closed its
investigation without commenting on the restraint.
112. Antidumping provisions are codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677k (1988 & West Supp.
1995).
113. See Gifford, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 278; see also Roger P. Alford, Note, Why A
Private Right of Action Against Dumping Would Violate GATT, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 696, 706
(1991) ("Antitrust policy favors vigorous competition from all sources, including imports. An-
tidumping policy seeks to protect American competitors from unfair foreign price discrimination
and is skeptical of vigorous import competition. These policy differences often come into sharp
conflict .. ") (citations omitted).
114. See infra notes 182-204 and accompanying text (discussing the use of automobile and
steel VRA's).
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accident. 115 Rather, comparative advantage can be (and is) created
artificially by governments."" This is especially true in industries
with large economies of scale in relation to the total size of the mar-
ket. Learning curve effects reinforce the advantage which govern-
ments can confer.117
The industrial paradigm is an industry in which costs continu-
ously decline over large ranges of production, in which there are
significant learning curve effects and in which imperfections in the
market ensure that the benefits of lower costs will not be competed
away.118 High-technology industries in which substantial amounts of
research and development costs must be incurred fit this model.1 19
The trade theory literature has often used the Airbus/Boeing rivalry
as an example - should Europe provide Airbus with subsidies guar-
anteeing Airbus a major share of a market sector of limited poten-
tial volume, Boeing would be deterred from entering that sector.' 2°
The dispute between the United States and Japan over semicon-
ductor chips which arose in the 1980's can be seen through the
prism of the new trade theory.' 2' Under the American view of the
events, the Japanese market in chips was closed to American and
other foreign chip makers while the U.S. market was open to Japa-
nese chip producers.' 22 Beginning in the early 1980's Japanese chip
makers were in the ascendancy in the U.S. market and elsewhere.123
The new trade theory provides the following as a possible analysis of
these events: By protecting its own market, the Japanese govern-
ment conferred an advantage on its domestic producers, enabling
115. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN, RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 192-98 (1990) (explaining
that comparative advantage can be achieved through government intervention, particularly
through trade protection); ELHANAN HELPMAN & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, TRADE POLICY & MARKET
STRUCTURE 1-9 (1989) (discussing the new trade theory).
116. See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text (illustrating how a government can artifi-
cially create comparative advantage).
117. KRUGMAN, supra note 115, at 195-97. As explained by Krugman, the learning curve in-
volves an economic model where "there are neither static economies of scale nor explicit invest-
ment in R & D; instead the increasing returns take a dynamic form: higher output now reduces
the costs of production later. These learning-by-doing economies turn out to yield results very
similar to those in the other models." Id. at 195.
118. See id. (explaining the learning curve).
119. The semiconductor industry is one example. Id. at 199.
120. HELPMAN & KRUGMAN, supra note 115, at 6-7; Paul R. Krugman, Is Free Trade Passe?
1 ECON. PERSP. 131, 135-37 (1987).
121. KRUGMAN, supra note 115, at 199-225.
122. LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO'S BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECH-
NOLOGY INDUSTRIES 98-101 (1992).
123. Id. at 103-06.
1995] 1067
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
them to attain scale efficiencies and to proceed further on their
learning curves than they could have done, had that market been
open and subject to competition from American and other foreign
producers. 2 Protection, in cases like this one, is not purely defen-
sive. 125 Rather, protection invests domestic industries with scale and
learning curve advantages which enable them to attain a higher
level of international competitiveness than they otherwise could. 12 6
Paul Krugman has tentatively estimated that without protection, the
Japanese semiconductor industry would not have survived. 27 As a
result of protection, however, that industry became a potent force.128
In short, under the right circumstances, protection can distort the
global market by conferring artificial advantages on domestic pro-
ducers and can handicap those firms which otherwise would have
attained even higher levels of efficiency.
The transformation of market relationships in the ways described
by the new trade theory is a complex phenomenon. The alteration of
market forces to produce a less efficient outcome appears inconsis-
tent with the policies underlying antitrust laws. 29 Yet because it is
rarely possible to erect trade barriers within the United States by
segmenting off a particular geographic area, 30 there is no parallel
within conventional antitrust experience to government-conferred
comparative advantages. Certainly there is no parallel to the advan-
tages allegedly conferred upon the Japanese semiconductor chip in-
dustry by the Japanese government protection of its own internal
market.' 3'
Although the creation of comparative advantages through trade
124. KRUGMAN, supra note 115, at 190-98 (outlining this economic model).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 200.
128. Id.; TYsoN, supra note 122, at 98; see Michael Borrus & Judith Goldstein, The Political
Economy of International Trade Law and Policy: United States Trade Protection: Institutions,
Norms & Practices, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. Bus. 328, 357 (1987) (stating that from 1978 to 1986,
Japan's share of the world semiconductor market rose from 24% to 46%).
129. See supra notes 4-7, 91 and accompanying text (stating that the goal of antitrust is to
maximize efficiency).
130. A geographical market segmentation was effected in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union
No. 2, 325 U.S. 797 (1945). In Allen Bradley, the Court held that it is a violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act for labor unions and their members, though furthering their own interests as wage
earners, to combine with manufacturers of goods to restrain competition, and to monopolize the
marketing of such goods in interstate commerce. Id. at 810. That case, however, did not involve
economies which were derived from geographical market protection.
131. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text (discussing Japan's protectionist policies
regarding its semiconductor industry).
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barriers is widely seen as inconsistent with the efficiency principles
underlying free-trade and antitrust policies, 182 an analysis of the
phenomenon reveals its complexity. First, the Japanese closure of its
domestic market to foreign chip suppliers meant that Japanese com-
puter manufacturers and other users of semiconductor chips had to
obtain their supplies from Japanese sources.138 Similar situations oc-
cur whenever any nation erects trade barriers over an input: in such
cases domestic final product producers are forced to use domestic
sources for inputs. This arrangement is thus tantamount to vertical
integration between the input sources and the final product produc-
ers. In most cases of trade protection, this arrangement is inefficient
because it forces domestic final product producers to purchase un-
duly high-cost inputs and handicaps the domestic final product pro-
ducers in their competition with foreign rivals.' 3 4  In Laura
D'Andrea Tyson's words, protection over an input makes a nation
"a high-price island.' 38
Yet the results of the Japanese chip protection apparently in-
creased the efficiency of the protected input producers. 36 It brought
these firms not only further along on a static declining cost curve,
but pushed them further along the learning curve, a dynamic result
which reduced the level of the production cost curve itself.' 87 If a
single firm vertically integrates forward to absorb a substantial cus-
tomer base and thereby increases its efficiency in producing inputs,
would we condemn that integration as an antitrust violation? 188
Would we so condemn the integration if, after it was accomplished,
the integrating input manufacturer could produce the inputs at a
lower cost than its rivals? Would it make any difference if the ex-
132. Daniel J. Gifford & Mitsuo Matsushita, Antitrust or Competition Laws Viewed in a
Trading Context: Harmony or Dissonance? in HARMONIZATION AND FAIR TRADE: PREREQUISITES
FOR FREE TRADE? (MIT Press 1996) (forthcoming).
133. TYSON, supra note 122, at 95 (describing the effects of Japanese protection: during the
1970s Japanese output producers were purchasing Japanese semiconductor chips despite the
higher quality and lower prices available in American chips).
134. Id. at 272.
135. Id.
136. KRUGMAN, supra note 115, at 199-225.
137. A learning curve represents the lowering of costs through cumulative experience whereas
the production cost curve refers to the relation between cost and volume at any one time. Protec-
tion can assist domestic producers to advance further along a declining cost production curve, but
it may, over time, provide domestic producers with the cumulative experience which will lower the
production cost curve.
138. See supra notes 61-82 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing incorporation of
efficiency values in the antitrust assessments of exclusive supplier/customer relations).
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cluded input-manufacturer rivals also possessed the option of en-
hancing their own efficiencies through vertical integration? Merely
asking these questions reveals the complicated ramifications of the
Japanese trade policy under review.
As a matter of technical legal doctrine, U.S. policy makers ap-
pear to have been on sound ground when they objected to the exclu-
sion of American and other foreign chips from the Japanese market
in the early 1980's.3 9 Exclusion of foreign chips violates the GATT
prohibitions on non-tariff trade barriers.4 0 Yet the normative force
of the postulated GATT violation is undercut if it can be avoided by
vertical integration of chip producing and chip consuming indus-
tries. If, instead of baring imports at the border, Japan encouraged
this kind of vertical integration under the rationale that it would
promote the efficiency of domestic chip production, would such a
policy have been "GATT-illegal"?
In the circumstances described above, the exclusion of foreign
chips from Japan was also objectionable on the grounds that it de-
tracted from global efficiency (and thus welfare).1 4' Yet, the exclu-
sion was probably welfare-enhancing for Japan. While the further-
ance of global welfare underlies the advance towards free trade
under the original GATT and the newly revised GATT 1994,142 it
cannot yet be said that the advancement of global efficiency is a
recognized legal principle. Too many nations - including all of the
major trading jurisdictions - act otherwise.
Indeed, that is just the point. Almost all nations act to promote
their own welfare, even when global welfare is not enhanced. Ja-
pan's behavior in the chip industry can be so interpreted. The Euro-
pean subsidy of Airbus might be so interpreted. 43 The United
139. See Reagan Imposes Higher Tariffs on Computers, Tools, TVs in Response to Accord
Violations 4 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 16, at 536 (Apr. 22, 1987) (reporting U.S. semiconduc-
tor industry approval of sanctions against Japan for failing to open its market to U.S. firms); Boyd
France, et al., Can the U.S. Avert A Trade War With Japan?, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 8, 1985, at 50
(reporting U.S. opposition to Japan's closed markets); Christopher Madison, Flirting With Reci-
procity - New U.S. Trade Policy Makes Some People Nervous, THE NAT'L J., Feb. 20, 1982, at
320 (reporting Deputy U.S. Trade Representative David R. MacDonald's position that the U.S.
must seek remedies for Japan's closed market).
140 See GATT, supra note 1, Art. III (expressing the goal of eliminating non-tariff trade bar-
riers) & Art. XI:l (prohibiting non-tariff border restrictions).
141. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text (discussing global efficiency).
142. GATT is designed to promote free trade between countries by eliminating trade barriers.
See GATT, supra note 1, Art. III. The Uruguay Round Agreements are incorporated in the Final
Act, supra note 1.
143. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (referring to the European subsidy of Airbus).
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States also acts in a variety of ways to enhance its welfare, even
when global welfare suffers, as the auto parts case demonstrates. 14 4
Yet the United States alone is afflicted by institutional schizophre-
nia in these circumstances. This is because the United States has
become a prisoner of its own free-market ideology.14' As a result, its
officials are unable to articulate policies which differentiate between
the furtherance of global welfare and the furtherance of national
welfare.
IV. INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND PROTECTIONISM
Another American myth is that, contrary to the practice of other
industrial nations, the United States pursues no industrial poli-
cies."" There is more to this myth. It is said that industrial policies
do not work - that industrial policies involve the picking of winners
and losers among industries and firms in the marketplace. 4 7 Such
an endeavor is self-defeating because the government is no better
able to pick winners than anyone else. Indeed, the power of the col-
lective activity that is the market vastly exceeds the ability of any
alternative in picking potentially profitable industries or technolo-
gies. 48 Moreover, the government is the worst possible body to be-
come involved in market interventions, because the government is
subject to political pressures and the strongest political pressures are
likely to come from established industries which are losing their
market advantages. As a result, the government is likely to act ex-
actly contrary to the national interest. It is likely to support failing
144. See supra notes 52-114 and accompanying text (discussing the trade dispute between the
U.S. and Japan over auto parts).
145. See supra notes 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing the myths surrounding U.S.
economic policy).
146. See IAN MAITLAND, WHO WON THE INDUSTRIAL POLICY DEBATE? (Center of the Ameri-
can Experiment 1994); Steven C. Earl, The Need For An American Industrial Policy, 1993
B.Y.U. L. REV. 765 (criticizing America's failure to have an industrial policy, and advocating the
formulation of one); see also Steven Greenhouse, The Calls for an Industrial Policy Grow
Louder, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1992, at § 3, at 5 (reporting a growing national sentiment that the
government should aid high-technology industries); R.C. Longworth, Experts Agree Government
Must Help to Save Computer Industry, CHI. TRIB., May 20, 1992, at 12 (reporting the growing
need for an industrial policy involving government and industry cooperation in the development of
future technologies).
147. See Maitland, supra note 146.
148. Because the market embodies the aggregate decisionmaking of an indefinitely large num-
ber of actors actively concerned with the actual and potential operation of particular business
firms, it is virtually impossible for any one institution to collect and to assess equivalent
information.
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industries and to impose undue costs upon so-called "sunrise"
industries. 1 9
In fact and contrary to this myth, however, the United States
does have industrial policies.150 These policies are often unorganized
and conflicting. 51 Some of them resemble industrial policies com-
monly pursued by other nations.'52 American industrial policies,
however, are distinguished by their incoherence. Because this Arti-
cle is concerned with the relation between American trade policies
and antitrust policies, my remarks on industrial policy focus on this
relationship.
First, the antitrust laws are a kind of industrial policy; albeit one
that imperfectly conforms to the American myth that the govern-
ment does not, or should not, intervene in the market. 5 ' As cur-
rently understood, the antitrust laws embody a national commitment
to a free market policy, whose objectives are the furtherance of pro-
ductive and allocative efficiency.' 5 Second, as noted throughout this
Article, American trade policy is overtly oriented towards a general
reduction of trade barriers throughout the world.' 55 This policy is
reflected :in the actions of the United States in organizing the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947156 and in the periodic
149. Telecommunications, computers, and information technology, are some examples of "sun-
rise" industries - the high-technology industries of the future. Alan Cane, Asia-Pacific Will
Head Spenders - As Technology Advances, Equipment Prices Are Falling/Telecom Equipment -
Prospects for Suppliers, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at 8.
150. See ROBERT B. REICH, TALES OF A NEW AMERICA 230-31 (1988); TYSON, supra note 134,
at 288-89; see also PRESTOWITZ, supra note 28, at 505 (describing uncoordinated U.S. economic
policies).
151. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
152. The U.S., like Japan, has instituted import quotas on various articles. National Industrial
Policy Could Stave Off Protectionism, Bergsten Says 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 739
(Apr. 22, 1992). Moreover, the Clinton administration has made it clear that it would play an
active role in helping U.S. industries compete against foreign industries that are supported by
their governments. Clinton Administration Said to Take Tough Approach in Relations With Ja-
pan, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 48, at 2064 (Dec. 2, 1992).
153. See supra notes 1-44 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. free market policies, their
accompanying myths, and the contradictory trade policies also pursued).
154. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, "The Antitrust Paradox" Revisited: Robert Bork and the
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1445 (1990) (explaining
that since Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, the federal enforcement agencies have followed Rob-
ert Bork's antitrust policy of "productive and allocative efficiency.").
155. See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text (describing the coincidence in efficiency
goals between antitrust and free trade and the overt adherence of the United States to those
goals).
156. See GATT, supra note 1. On the history of the GATT, see ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE
GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 5-61 (2d ed. 1990) (tracing the develop-
ment of the GATT from discussions among the allies during World War II through the GATT
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negotiations and agreements which have progressively lowered tar-
iffs in the intervening years.15 7 It is reflected in the Uruguay Round
negotiations and in the resulting agreements revising the GATT and
establishing the World Trade Organization. 158 As previously ob-
served, the efficiency goals of the antitrust laws have a counterpart
in the implicit efficiency goals of American trade policy, as ex-
pressed in the GATT, and the WTO.' "
Third, at the same time that U.S. antitrust policy and U.S. trade
negotiation policy are pursuing free markets, free trade and their
associated efficiency goals,' 60 the antidumping laws' 6' and the
VRA's negotiated by U.S. officials 162 are fostering protection and
inefficiency. The standards built into the U.S. antidumping laws are
basically inconsistent with the standards embodied in the U.S. anti-
trust laws and incorporated into U.S. trade negotiation policy 68 and
there are no standards governing the negotiation of VRA's by U.S.
officials.'4
Fourth, the United States, like most other nations, intervenes
massively into the operation of the market in a whole variety of
ways. The enactment of the National Labor Relations Act in
1935,16" for example, was a massive intervention, designed to facili-
tate the unionization of mass production industry, and thus to con-
fer monopoly power over the supply of industry-specific labor.' 66 For
many years, the United States government (through the actions of
agreement and the failure of the abortive International Trade Organization).
157. See John H. Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs
and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1570, 1573 (1984)
(observing that between 1947-1979, there was a large overall reduction in the level of tariffs,
which was accomplished through seven GATT negotiating rounds held during this time).
158. Final Act, supra note 1.
159. See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text (discussing the efficiency goals of U.S. trade
policy).
160. See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text (referring to the efficiency goals of antitrust
and free trade and the overt adherence of the United States to those goals).
161. See supra notes 15-18, & 112 and accompanying text (discussing the antidumping laws).
162. See infra notes 182-204 and accompanying text (discussing the automobile and steel
VRA's negotiated by the U.S.).
163. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text (discussing official positions of the U.S.
Trade Representative).
164. See infra notes 274-76 and accompanying text (discussing the related orderly marketing
agreement standards).
165. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988 & West Supp. 1995). The Act was substantially modified in
1947 with the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988).
166. See Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1379,
1396-97 (1988) [hereinafter Gifford, Redefining] (pointing out that Congress sought to raise the
wage levels of the working classes by fostering unionization).
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the Federal Reserve Board) aided industrial unions in their efforts
to raise wages in manufacturing industries. For instance, when in-
creases in the wage rate increased the level of unemployment, the
government was able to respond by increasing the money supply,
thereby exerting a stimulative effect upon the economy and easing
unemployment. 6" This particular industrial policy converted effi-
cient industries into high wage cost industries, thus disadvantaging
them in international competition."
Fifth, like other industrial nations, the United States attempts to
preserve economically important industries which are threatened by
import competition. Major examples have involved textiles, automo-
biles, steel, machine tools, and semiconductors. 6 9 Sometimes gov-
ernment has intervened to rescue particular firms, like Chrysler and
Lockheed.17 0 Whether these interventions are well-advised is debata-
ble; the answer depends upon a host of variables which in the aggre-
gate determine whether the threatened industry or firm is likely
(subsequent to - and because of - the intervention) to achieve a
level of efficiency which will enable it to prosper in the future.
Unlike other industrial nations, however, the United States gener-
ally does little to ensure that the industries threatened by foreign
rivals will in fact restructure themselves to attain the requisite level
of efficiency. In the European Union, the European Economic Com-
mission authorizes so-called "crisis cartels" under which the indus-
try collectively produces a plan for capacity reduction and new in-
vestment, as a result of which the industry emerges with less
capacity but with a more efficient plant.'7 Japan deals in similar
ways with industries which have lost their relative efficiency vis-a-vis
167. ROBERT J. GORDON, MACROECONOMICS 192 (1978).
168. Gifford, Redefining, supra note 166, at 1423-26; see JUNICHI GOTO, LABOR IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE THEORY 130-31 (1990) (explaining that one of the reasons the U.S. automobile
industry is disadvantaged in automobile trade is due to its differentially higher wage rates).
169. See infra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (discussing agreements designed to allocate
quotas for textiles in the third world), infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (discussing auto-
mobile VRA's), infra notes 187-204 and accompanying text (discussing steel VRA's), infra note
220 and accompanying text (referring to U.S. protection of the machine tools industry) & infra
notes 205-12 and accompanying text (discussing semiconductor agreements with Japan).
170. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1875 (1988); see
Cheryl D. Block, Overt and Covert Bailouts: Developing A Public Bailout Policy. 67 IND. L.J.
951, 953 n.4 (1992) (noting that Congress enacted the Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 1971,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852 (1988), primarily in response to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's
financial crisis).
171. See Synthetic Fiber Agreement, Commission Decision of July 4, 1984, Com. Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1 10,606.
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foreign rivals. 7 ' The Law on Temporary Measures for the Stabili-
zation of Specified Industries authorized (1) a type of depression
cartel under which member firms would agree upon a reduction of
industry capacity and how that capacity reduction would be allo-
cated and (2) a business co-operative arrangement under which the
industry would be reorganized under a government "master
plan." 7 3
The United States avoids these kinds of direct governmental in-
tervention and refuses, even in the face of an urgent need for indus-
trial restructuring, to permit restructuring pursuant to an industry
agreement. 174 The United States avoids direct intervention because
such intervention in industrial structuring would be counter to the
belief that the market alone is capable of deciding such questions. 175
The closest that the United States has come to mandating the re-
structuring that should be the only raison d'etre for protection
(other than facilitating exit) were (1) the purely hortatory mandate
for steel plant modernization included in 1984 legislation providing
a scheme of temporary protection for that industry 76 and (2) the
Congressional decision to permit (but not to require) an industry
adjustment plan in return for "safeguards" type protection. 7 7 As a
result, industry agreements about industrial restructuring are widely
viewed (within the government as well as outside the government)
as violations of the antitrust laws. 7 8
Thus, the United States follows other industrial nations in provid-
ing relief to an important industry threatened by foreign rivals. It
172. See, e.g., TAKATOSHI ITO, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 204-05 (1992) (discussing depression
cartels); MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN JAPAN 280-85
(1993) (discussing measures for the relief of depressed industries).
173. MATSUSHITA, supra note 172, at 284 (1993).
174. Cartel agreements are illegal per se under the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940).
175. See supra notes 1-51 and accompanying text (discussing the overt free-market ideals of
the United States).
176. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, P.L. 98-573 § 806, 98 Stat. 2948 (1984) (Steel Import
Stabilization Act); see also G.C. HUFBAUER & H.F. ROSEN, TRADE POLICY FOR TROUBLED IN-
DUSTRIES 72 (1986) (discussing same).
177. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(1) (1988) (containing standards for International Trade Com-
mission recommendations on relief for distressed industries); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 663 (1988), reprinted in 4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1696, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988) (rejecting a mandatory requirement of an industry adjustment plan).
178. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (citing cases holding that horizontal price-
fixing and market division agreements are per se illegal).
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provides this relief through the antidumping laws,179 through negoti-
ated VRA's,'80 and more rarely through the safeguards provisions of
section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act.181 Yet the United States fails to
provide a plan or to permit the industry to plan for the industry's
reinvigoration. The United States thus has adopted one half of the
policies of other industrial nations: the half providing for protection
or intervention. But it has failed to adopt the complementary other
half of those policies: the use of affirmative means of ensuring that
the protection or intervention will be effective in enhancing the effi-
ciency of the affected industry.
The result is that the United States has become the prisoner of its
own myths. If the United States is unwilling to ensure that a
threatened industry is restructured, then protection should be lim-
ited to facilitating the exit of that industry from the market. If,
however, the United States provides protection for reasons other
than assisting exit, it should employ effective means to further its
objectives. The difference in approach to corporate restructuring be-
tween Europe and Japan, on one hand, and the United States, on
the other, is rooted in the fact that Europe and Japan are not pris-
oners of the fairness and associated myths affecting American atti-
tudes to protection and restructuring.
The now expired Japanese automobile VRA shows both the posi-
tive effects and the associated weaknesses of U.S. industrial policy.
The VRA with Japan was negotiated in 1981, at a time when the
U.S. automobile industry was hard pressed by import competi-
tion.' 82 In a sense, the VRA can be said to have attained its pur-
poses as the domestic automobile industry appears to have recov-
ered.' 83 However, the behavior of U.S. auto companies during the
period of protection was not properly aligned with the national in-
179. Antidumping provisions are codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677k (1988 & West Supp.
1995).
180. See infra notes 182-204 and accompanying text (discussing the use of VRA's in the auto-
mobile and steel industries).
181. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (West Supp. 1995).
182. See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, The Automobile Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 126, 159 (Walter Adams ed., 7th ed. 1986) (discussing the history of the
U.S. automobile industry's reliance on government protection).
183. See Paul A. Eisenstein, Can Big Three Automakers Keep Up Profit Bonanza?, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 7, 1995, at 9 (reporting that the big three U.S. automobile
companies made record profits in 1994 totalling $13.9 billion); Robert Gebeloff, Money and
Share; Ford Passes Out Pieces of Profit Pie - Average Worker Gets $4,000 Check, THE REC-
ORD, Mar. 9, 1995, at DI (reporting record profits of $5.3 billion by the Ford Motor Company).
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terest, an alignment that should have been demanded as the price
for protection. Thus, there is evidence that the auto companies
slowed their internal adjustments to Japanese competition as a re-
sult of the VRA,184 thereby frustrating the public policy behind it.
Moreover, in 1986 when shifts in the relative values of the dollar
and the yen advantaged the U.S. auto companies, they chose to im-
pose a significant price increase rather than to reclaim lost market
share.1 8 5 This behavior was understandable, since the U.S. govern-
ment had negotiated an international cartel on their behalf, but it
was one which had been intended to protect market share rather
than to facilitate oligopoly pricing.1 8 6
Similar criticisms can be made of U.S. policy on steel. VRA's and
other forms of protection were in place for most of the period from
1969 to 1992, a twenty-three year period. 1 7 Steel VRA's were first
negotiated in 1968 by the Johnson Administration in order to fore-
stall legislation imposing quotas on steel imports."88 These VRA's
affected nine Japanese companies, British Steel Corp. and various
steel producers of the European Coal and Steel Community.8 '
Originally for three years, these VRA's were renewed in 1972 and
remained in effect until 1974.190 Pursuant to regulations issued by
the Treasury in 1978, a so-called "trigger price mechanism" (TPM)
for implementing accelerated antidumping proceedings was estab-
lished and remained in effect until 1982.191 The system was pre-
184. See Alan C. Swan, The "Escape Clause" and the Safeguards Wrangle, 1989 B.Y.U.L.
Rev. 431, 439 (stating that there is evidence that adjustment efforts made by the U.S. automobile
industry were abandoned after implementation of the VRA) (citation omitted).
185. The 1986 price increases were foreshadowed by significant increases in 1983. See Adams
& Brock, supra note 182, at 160 (stating that as a result of the VRA import quotas, new car
prices rose an average of $800 to $1,000 in 1983).
186. See id. at 159-60 (discussing the VRA import quotas on Japanese automobiles).
187. See WILLIAM T. HOGAN, S.J., GLOBAL STEEL IN THE 1990's 144-49 (1991) (providing a
brief history of these protections accorded the steel industry).
188. See id. at 144 (discussing how the steel industry in the U.S. placed pressure on Congress
to limit steel imports, and the resulting protection which Congress and the Executive afforded).
189. See id. (noting that Japan, and a combination of European countries led by West Ger-
many all instituted VRA's).
190. See id. at 144-45 (discussing the international use of VRA's at the beginning of the 1970's
and the reasons they fell out of use); Note, Protecting Steel. Time for a New Approach, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 866 (1983) (criticizing the U.S. government's protectionist measures as unworkable and
counterproductive); see also Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 1321
(D.D.C. 1973) (discussing the renewal agreements of 1972), affid as modified sub. nora. Consum-
ers Union of U.S. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975).
191. See 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214 (1978) (announcing that the Secretary of the Treasury would
implement a TPM in 1978 to determine whether it is appropriate to conduct investigations under
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mised on the Japanese cost of production, a cost which at that time
was believed to be the world's lowest, plus freight costs from Japan
to the United States. 1"2 Sales within the United States at less than
the Japanese cost of production would invoke the accelerated pro-
ceedings. 193 Since the TPM was based on Japanese costs, however,
it was especially affected by currency fluctuations.1 94 As the dollar
strengthened against the yen, the trigger-price level fell. U.S. steel
producers, dissatisfied with the operation of the TPM, instituted
proceedings against European producers in 1980 but withdrew them
when the Government raised the trigger-price level.' 95 The TPM,
however, was terminated in 1982 when the steel industry again in-
stituted significant numbers of antidumping and countervailing duty
cases against exports from Europe and South America. 196 The de-
mise of the TPM, however, coincided with an influx of steel imports.
As a result, during 1984-85 the Reagan Administration negotiated
quota agreements with most of the steel exporting nations. 197 These
VRA's expired in 1992.198
Like the auto industry, the steel industry has apparently emerged
in relatively healthy condition from its period of protection.' 99 Also
like the auto industry, the steel industry exploited the protection of
the VRA's (and the TPM), lagging in the restructuring which the
extensive period of protection was designed to facilitate."' Thus, ac-
the Antidumping Act); see also Davis Walker Corp. v. Blumenthal, 460 F. Supp. 283, 288-89
(D.D.C. 1978) (discussing the TPM); ROBERT REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 176-77
(1983) (criticizing the U.S. steel industry's use of quotas and antidumping laws under the TPM).
192. Protecting Steel, supra note 190, at 876.
193. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing the accelerated proceedings).
194. Walter Adams & Hans Mueller, The Steel Industry, in THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY, supra note 182, at 74, 94-96 (providing a brief history of the TPM system, and stating
that it was "intimately linked to exchange-rate fluctuations").
195. Id. at 96.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 96-97.
198. HOGAN, supra note 187, at 146. Following the expiration of the VRA's, so-called bilateral
consensus agreements between the United States and various other steel producing nations have
governed steel trade; see id. at 146-47 (noting that the agreements were to take effect after the
expiration of the VRA's on March 31, 1992). These agreements are designed to prohibit subsidies
and to open markets, thus equalizing trading environments. Id. at 146.
199. See Nick Gilbert, Norfolk Southern Can Read a Railroad Map. Where Does the Boss
Want to Go Now?, FINANCIAL WORLD, Mar. 14, 1995, at 28 (reporting that the U.S. steel indus-
try "has been going [like] gangbusters"); Tony Taccone, Big Steelmakers Must Consolidate or
Face Demise; The Nation's Integrated Producers Face Challenges that Require a Radical Re-
thinking of Business as Usual, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 7, 1995, at D20 (reporting that the
North American steel industry is currently making record profits).
200. Protecting Steel, supra note 190, at 876-77 & 877 nn.63-64 (citations omitted).
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cording to one source, during the six years of the first set of VRA's,
the industry's prices rose rapidly despite substantial idle capacity
while its capital expenditures remained below their level for 1968.201
Even so, the industry apparently outspent its European and Japa-
nese rivals during the 1960-78 period. 202 The charge has been made,
however, that the industry failed during this period to concentrate
this investment on modern blast-furnace technology, a failure which
was finally corrected only during the 1980's.203
In 1984, Congress took the unusual step of including a require-
ment of plant modernization as a quid pro quo for import relief in
the Steel Import Stabilization Act of 1984.204 While this require-
ment was a gesture in the right direction, the requirement nonethe-
less appears to have been purely hortatory, there having been no
public or private agency responsible for overseeing its
accomplishment.
Only in the case of the semiconductor industry did the U.S. Gov-
ernment behave in a way consistent with an industry-rejuvenation
plan which met the conditions of a global marketplace. When the
American semiconductor industry was subjected to severe price
pressure from Japanese rivals in the early to mid-1980's, the United
States government negotiated the first of two semiconductor agree-
ments with Japan, agreements which were more sophisticated than
the usual VRA's.206 The semiconductor agreements with Japan were
structured to eliminate allegedly predatory pricing"' while at the
same time ensuring that United States did not become a "high price
island" for chips °.20  Even so, the 1986 Semiconductor Trade Agree-
ment achieved its result only at the expense of encouraging collusive
pricing behavior by Japanese semiconductor producers at a time of
peak demand.2 08 Professor Tyson argues that company-specific an-
201. Id. at 874.
202. WILLIAM T. HOGAN, S.J., CAPITAL INVESTMENTS IN STEEL 22-28 (1992).
203. Id.
204. The Steel Import Stabilization Act of 1984 was part of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1994.
Pub. L. No. 98-573 § 806(b), 98 Stat. 3046 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (West Supp. 1995)).
205. See TYSON, supra note 134, at 106-10 (discussing the 1986 Semiconductor Trade Agree-
ment) & 130-32 (discussing the 1991 Semiconductor Trade Agreement).
206. See the so-called "Hitachi memo," 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 780 (1985) (evidencing
allegedly predatory pricing). According to U.S. Government officials, the memo (pertaining to
EPROM semiconductor chips) stated: "Quote 10 percent below their price. If they requote, go 10
percent again. Don't quit 'till you win.") Id.
207. See id. at 138 (describing how in the absence of the semiconductor agreements, applica-
tion of U.S. dumping laws would have injured American computer companies).
208. Id.
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tidumping duties would have been an improvement over the tempo-
rary price floor that resulted from the agreement. 0 9 In her view,
company-specific duties might have encouraged price competition
among the Japanese companies in their American sales.2 10 An even
more sophisticated approach to rescuing the American semiconduc-
tor industry in 1986 would have involved the payment of subsi-
dies."' The latter approach would have facilitated the recovery of
the American semiconductor industry while keeping prices low and
output high throughout the world. 12
Thus in fact, the United States government has protected
threatened domestic industries from import competition. In the case
of semiconductors, the U.S. government has gone further. Its inter-
vention was designed not merely to protect the place of a domestic
industry in the domestic market, but was designed to restore the
industry as an effective international competitor in the world mar-
ket.2 13 In addition to these interventions, the U.S. government is,
and has been, a party to global allocations of production and sales.
It was a party to the Cotton Textiles Agreement " and to the
Multi-Fiber Agreement, 1 5 allocating quotas for textiles among
third-world nations. Recently, largely as a result of a surge of Rus-
sian aluminum exports, the United States government (including
representatives of the Department of Justice) participated in inter-
national negotiations for reducing worldwide aluminum production
capacity.1
209. Id. at 138-39.
210. Id. at 139.
211. Id. at 139-40. Payment of subsidies to U.S. producers would have deterred the exit and/or
encouraged the reentry of U.S. semiconductor suppliers while reducing the probability of cartels
emerging. Id. at 139. Paul Krugman has advocated a similar subsidy approach limited to a small
number of important sectors. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE AGE OF DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS 153
(1990).
212. TYSON, supra note 134 at 139-40.
213. Id. at 109-10.
214. Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Feb. 9,
1962, 13 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240, 471 U.N.T.S. 296.
215. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, 25 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No.
7840 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1974, except for art. 2, paras. 2, 3, and 4, which entered into
force Apr. 1, 1974).
216. See Justice Department Aids In Aluminum Production Cuts, 66 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1649, at 148 (Feb. 3, 1994) (reporting a Memorandum of Understanding ap-
proved by the governments of the world's major aluminum producing nations incorporating a pro-
duction-cutting agreement). The impetus for the agreement was a rapid surge in Russian exports
from 300,000 tons in 1990 to 1.6 million tons in 1993. Id. The agreement, negotiated in January,
was signed on March 1, 1994 by the United States, Russia, the European Union, Australia, Ca-
nada, and Norway. Id.; see Erie Norton & Martin du Bois, Foiled Competition: Don't Call It a
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All of this governmental market intervention calls for the articu-
lation of a coherent overall U.S. economic policy. The unarticulated
policy position of the U.S. government is that, in certain circum-
stances, international cartels are justified.217 The Cotton Textiles
Agreement, the Multi-Fiber Agreement, and the Memorandum of
Understanding on aluminum attest to that part of our policies which
employ multi-national agreements to allocate sales or output in in-
dustries afflicted with overcapacity. The U.S. government has also
shown that it accepts intervention in the form of protection for the
purpose of facilitating the restructuring of domestic industries: it
has provided protection for the steel,2 18 automobile, 1 9 and machine
tool industries2 0 while they restructured themselves to regain inter-
national competitiveness. The government provided its most imagi-
native support to the semiconductor industry. 2
As a society we choose to emphasize our commitments to free
markets and to free trade goals. There is no doubt that these goals
are real and that our commitments to them are serious. Yet free-
market and free-trade policies are only components in our overall
policy response to global trade. Our overall policy response includes
a place for international cartels and government-sheltered industrial
restructuring. Because we, as a nation, have articulated no compre-
hensive schema under whose umbrella we could harmonize these su-
perficially conflicting approaches, our policies appear to be (and are)
incoherent and confused. We refuse to admit that we indeed have a
set of industrial policies, some of which are explicitly interventionist
and protectionist. We cover over our interventionist policies with
rhetoric employing a vocabulary of "fairness," fair trade, fair value
and similar terms even while we know that these terms, and the
procedures in which they are employed, are widely viewed as pre-
texts for naked protection. Like the vision embraced by the critical
Cartel, But World Aluminum Has Forged New Order, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at Al (describ-
ing the aluminum agreement).
217. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text (discussing examples of these "cartels").
218. See supra notes 187-98 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. trade policy on steel).
219. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. trade policy on
automobiles).
220. See U.S., Japan Initial Accord Limiting Tokyo's Machine Tool Exports Over Next Five
Years, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1421 (Nov. 26 1986) (reporting the negotiation of a VRA with
Japan on machine tools).
221. The 1986 Semi Conductor Trade Agreement was designed to deter dumping not only in
the United States but in the remainder of the world as well. See TYSON, supra note 134, at 110;
see also supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
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legal scholars, we tend to suppress the protectionist part of our poli-
cies rather than to acknowledge and to justify them if we can on
public interest grounds. The result is that we tolerate incoherent and
conflicting economic policies.
This lack of a conceptually comprehensive approach to economic
policy is ultimately corrosive of our governmental institutions. Be-
cause we have no officially articulated principles underlying our par-
ticipation in international cartels, our participation in them often
appears illegitimate. The principle justifying the aluminum agree-
ment is unclear.222 The principles supportinIg the various VRA's ne-
gotiated by the United States need articulation. Lacking such prin-
ciples, our officials who negotiate these international agreements are
not required to account effectively for their actions. Our sheltering
of vulnerable industries under the antidumping laws employs an ob-
solete economic theory imperfectly applied.223 In addition, the legal
process under which the antidumping laws are administered incor-
porates an archaic set of rules and standards. 224 As a result, these
laws and the process which they establish are widely viewed as lack-
ing any valid policy base and as therefore illegitimate and irrational.
The legitimacy of our own institutions therefore demands that the
protectionist underside of U.S. economic policy be forthrightly ac-
knowledged and publicly justified on plausible policy grounds if at
all possible. Otherwise, it should be overhauled or abolished.
V. VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT AGREEMENTS
A. The Use of Voluntary Restraint Agreements
As the preceding discussion shows, the United States has sought
temporary solutions to pressing trade problems in VRA's limiting
exports into the United States by foreign suppliers.22 s It is common
222. See supra note 216 (reporting that the impetus for the aluminum agreement was a surge
in Russian aluminim exports).
223. As should be clear from the discussion of the 1986 Semiconductor Trade Agreement, an-
tidumping law is likely to result in higher prices for domestic industries which employ the
"dumped" good as an input, thus disadvantaging those industries in international trade. See text
accompanying note 207. Thus not only the theory behind antidumping law is flawed, but so is the
result.
224. See Edwin A. Vermulst, The Antidumping Systems of Australia, Canada, the EEC and
the USA: Have Antidumping Laws Become a Problem in International Trade? in ANTIDUMPING
LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE. STUDY 425, 441-66 (John H. Jackson & Edward A.
Vermulst eds., 1989) (outlining the major issues in an antidumping case, many of which lend
themselves to technical exploitation by interested parties).
225. See text at notes 179-216 (describing VRAs and similar devices designed to protect Amer-
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knowledge that VRA's operate like a cartel, enabling American
oligopolists to divide monopoly profits with foreign suppliers at the
expense of American consumers. 26 This effect of VRA's has been
treated exhaustively in the literature. 27 What has not been treated
so thoroughly in the literature is the reason why VRA's have been
the instrument of choice for resolving trade frictions. Before exam-
ining the attractiveness of VRA's to policy makers, however, let me
explore some of the background conditions which give rise to the use
of VRA's.
Free trade assumes that the producers in every nation will be ex-
posed to the competition of rivals throughout the world. 8 Indeed,
that is the way globally competitive markets ensure that the more
efficient producers will replace the less efficient producers on a
worldwide scale. 22 '9 As a result of this global competition, some busi-
ness firms will be forced to exit the market and some nations may
lose whole industries when they are unable to meet challenges from
abroad.
There has long been a consensus among policymakers, however,
that domestic industries under substantial stress from import com-
petition are entitled to relief for a limited term, either (1) as a
means of facilitating their exit from the market while minimizing
the impact upon their employees or (2) as an aid for industrial re-
structuring. 30 The assumption underlying the latter alternative is
that the period of temporary relief will be employed for reinvest-
ment and downsizing so that the reorganized industry will be able to
meet global standards of competitiveness.3
ican industries from import competition deemed excessive by officials).
226. See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protection-
ism: The Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, 413 (1994)
(stating that VRA's involve "the formation of an export cartel among producers in the exporting
country").
227. Id.
228. BHAGWATI, supra note 2 (describing the circumstance in which no impediments to trade
were erected by governments; KREININ, supra note 3, at 316 governments); accord SAMUELSON &
NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 491.
229. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 3, at 467-80 (describing how free trade shifts the
allocation of resources to their most productive use).
230. This consensus among policymakers, however, is not reflected in a corresponding consensus
among academics. See, e.g., Alan 0. Sykes, Protectionism as a "'Safeguard". A Positive Analysis
of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 263-72
(1991) (discussing the problems of government imposed "safeguards" on industries).
231. See supra note 204 and accompanying text (discussing the congressional expectation that
steel corporations will modernize their plants to receive import relief under the Steel Import Sta-
bilization Act of 1984).
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This consensus was recognized in the original General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in Article XIX, the so-called "safe-
guards" (or "escape clause") provision. 2  Under this provision,
when "as a result of unforeseen developments" any product is being
imported into a nation's territory under such conditions "as to cause
or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of
like or directly competitive products," that nation is permitted to
suspend any obligation it has incurred under the GATT "for such
time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury ... "
American law incorporates the type of escape clause provision
contemplated by Article XIX in section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974.234 In fact, however, the United States and the other major
trading powers have often avoided the use of Article XIX in "safe-
guards" type situations. Indeed, most nations, when faced with an
Article XIX situation, have worked out arrangements under which
the threats to domestic industries are alleviated with VRA's.2 3' In-
deed, under the 1974 Trade Act itself the President is authorized to
negotiate "orderly marketing agreements" with foreign govern-
ments, agreements which are essentially equivalent to VRA's and
produce the same effects as VRA's. 37 Moreover, while Article XIX
contemplated temporary relief from import competition, 3 8 VRA's
in practice have often remained in place for indeterminate periods,
periods too long to be equated with the emergency measures con-
templated by Article XIX.
B. The Attractiveness of VRA's to Policymakers
A major attractiveness of a VRA to U.S. policymakers results
from the fact that the VRA provides a pay off to the foreign pro-
ducers whose exports are being limited. 9 The VRA reduces supply
in order to raise price to a level at which domestic producers can
earn profits.240 The foreign producers' willingness to limit their ex-
232. GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX(I)(a).
233. Id.
234. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (West Supp. 1995).
235. Professor Sykes has reported that the United States invoked Art. XIX 28 times between
1950 and 1986. Sykes, supra note 230, at 256 n.6.
236. Id. at 256-57.
237. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3)(E) (1994).
238. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text (discussing Art. XIX).
239. Sykes, supra note 230, at 297.
240. See Protecting Steel, supra note 190, at 874 (describing how the steel VRA's resulted in
increased domestic steel prices).
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ports is purchased with the supracompetitive revenues which they
receive on the smaller volume of exports. 4' Domestic consumers, of
course, pay the higher prices necessary to provide profits for domes-
tic producers and the enhanced profits necessary to purchase the co-
operation of the foreign producers. 42
Thus, VRA's are a worse policy choice than the imposition of a
tariff. A tariff limits imports by making them more expensive and as
such produces a result approximately as beneficial to domestic pro-
ducers as a VRA.24 3 But a tariff captures for the importing nation
the price premium on the imports which a VRA confers upon the
exporters." The net social result of a modest tariff is likely to be
welfare positive for the importing nation, and in any event is less
negative than a VRA or import quota. But the distribution of the
price premium to the exporters is precisely why the VRA has be-
come so popular. By purchasing foreign cooperation, the import re-
striction is easier to implement. Indeed, since the foreign producers
are either actual parties to the restriction or otherwise its benefi-
ciaries, there is little chance that the restriction will be challenged.
It is also possible to view the provisions of Article XIX which are
designed to limit the use of safeguards as a primary cause of the
widespread use of VRA's.24 5 Trading nations may view Article XIX
procedures as cumbersome and, worse, as limiting the scope of their
actions. Indeed, Article XIX may provide grounds for challenging
safeguards as too severe, too extensive or too prolonged. These
problems are avoided through the use of VRA's.
A second major attractiveness of a VRA for American politicians
results when the VRA takes the form of an agreement among for-
eign manufacturers in response to the demands of their own govern-
ment. " 6 As such, American officials can both enjoy the domestic
political benefits of the VRA and distance themselves from responsi-
bility for the VRA's existence. 7 The imposition of a duty or tariff
241. Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at 411-12.
242. See Protecting Steel, supra note 190, at 874 (describing how steel prices increased dra-
matically after implementation of a VRA).
243. See HELPMAN & KRUGMAN, supra note 120, at 12-14 (presenting comparative analyses of
tariffs and quotas).
244. Id. at 13.
245. Professor Sykes has observed that a number of writers have taken the position that the
strict conditions upon the use of Art. XIX have discouraged its use. Sykes, supra note 230, at 257.
246. See PRESTOWITZ, supra note 28, at 420-23 (describing the 1981 Japanese auto VRA).
247. A VRA, as an agreement among foreign producers to limit exports into the United States
is a horizontal conspiracy to limit output for the purpose of raising prices in the U.S. market and
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would, by contrast, involve positive government action for which
identifiable officials would bear responsibility.
The provision of public subsidies to a distressed domestic industry
is an additional option for assisting such an industry during the
emergency."" This option is vastly superior to the use of VRA's or
quotas because society pays only for the benefit conferred upon the
domestic industry and does not pay benefits to foreign exporters. It
is superior to a tariff insofar as government involvement does not
restrict supply and allows consumers to receive the benefits of indus-
try competition.
The subsidy option is disfavored by policymakers, because the
subsidy would be an actual expenditure of public funds which they
would have to approve and for which they would bear responsibil-
ity.24 9 VRA's, quotas and tariffs all provide equivalent subsidies, al-
though VRA's and quotas provide them less efficiently.2 50 VRA's,
quotas and tariffs, however, do not reveal with the clarity that subsi-
dies do the true costs that the importing economy incurs in support-
ing the domestic industry.
The recently concluded Uruguay Round Agreements have banned
the future use of VRA's.215 In their place, the revised GATT Agre-
ment has sought to restore redrafted safeguards provisions as the
primary tool for dealing with threats to a domestic industry. For
instance, the new agreement imposes an initial limit of four years
and an overall limit of eight years for imposition of safeguard mea-
thus a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). Schoenbaum, supra note
226, at 413. Therefore, the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission, which are the
official enforcers of the U.S. antitrust laws, necessarily must take into account more than these
overt illegalities when they decide not to proceed against the parties to a VRA. See id. (stating
that VRA's have not been attacked under the antitrust laws since the case of Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), affid as modified sub. noma. Consumers
Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975)).
248. See TYSON, supra note 134, at 285-86 (advocating the use of government subsidies to
assist domestic industries in certain situations); Sykes, supra note 230, at 265 ("[O]ther policy
instruments, such as loans and subsidies, are still preferable in theory to protection.").
249. See Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic Analysis of Law
in a New Key, 25 U. MEMPHIs L. REV. 1315, 1356-61 (1995); Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism,
Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act (forthcoming Emory L.J. 1995) (describ-
ing the predelection of officials to finance expenditures off-budget, so as to avoid accountability).
250. See discussion of the comparative effects of tariffs and VRAs, text accompanying notes
243-44 (pointing out the comparative disadvantages of a VRA from the viewpoint of the import-
ing nation).
251. Final Act, supra note 1, annex IA; Agreement on Safeguards, Art. (II)(1)(b), in Final
Act supra note 1.
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sures,2 52 thus ensuring that safeguards measures will be temporary
as originally intended.
C. The Avoidance of Responsibility by U.S. Policymakers
The VRA problem is intimately connected with the unwillingness
of U.S. policymakers to acknowledge a role for industrial policy.
The predominant and officially articulated national policies favor
free markets and free trade. These policies are reflected in the anti-
trust laws2 53 and in officially articulated trade policies.254 Other,
conflicting, national policies tend to be suppressed in official policy
statements. The anticompetitive policies embodied in U.S. trade
laws tend to be cloaked over in "fair trade" rhetoric, a rhetoric
which falsely suggests their underlying compatibility with the effi-
ciency principles underlying the antitrust laws.255
If efficiency principles actually governed, there would be no room
for employing VRA's as instruments of national policies, except as
means to ease the exit of a distressed industry from the market or as
a means to enable a distressed industry to restructure itself in order
to meet the challenge of international competition. These same
grounds limit the propriety of escape clause relief. Under the new
GATT 1994 obligations, these limitations are even more clear: the
explicitly temporary nature of escape clause relief ensures that such
relief will be used either to ease the exit of an industry which has
become incurably uncompetitive or to facilitate its restructuring. 56
The United States does provide import relief to distressed indus-
tries. 57 Yet the U.S. law disperses responsibility for these decisions
and fails to provide an adequate framework for assessing the wis-
dom of the actions taken.258 On the one hand, the U.S. International
Trade Commission is responsible for affording relief under the safe-
252. Id. Art. 7(1), (3).
253. 15 U.S.C. § I et. seq. (1988).
254. See supra notes 1-20 & 31-45 and accompanying text (discussing official positions of the
U.S. government which reflect these policies).
255. See supra notes 15-19 & 31-43 and accompanying text (describing American attitudes
towards free trade).
256. See supra note 252 (discussing the temporary nature of the safeguards under the Final
Act).
257. See text at notes 179-216 (describing protection afforded a number of important U.S.
industries).
258. As pointed out in text, responsibility over various aspects of the trade law administration is
dispersed among the Commerce Department, the U.S. International Trade Commission, the U.S.
Trade Representative and the President.
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guards provisions of section 201.259 Yet the safeguards provisions
are only rarely used. In their place, VRA's are often negotiated by
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.2 60 Generally, the U.S.
Trade Representative acts under the direction of the President. Yet
the statutory framework in which these actions are taken is largely
barren of standards. 6' Indeed, the statutory framework for import
relief is generally ignored.
When U.S. officials negotiate a VRA, the result at least some-
times appears on its face to be a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. 62 This occurs when the VRA takes the form of an export car-
tel, as did the Japanese VRA on auto exports to the United
States. 263 A government-to-government agreement is, of course, not
subject to this analysis.
In VRA's like the Japanese auto VRA, the Department of Jus-
tice, which is responsible for enforcing the Sherman Act, is placed
in an awkward position. The Department, of course, will not at-
tempt to undo an agreement reached pursuant to a Presidential di-
rective.264 In fact, the VRA is immune to antitrust attack when the
foreign producers' adherence to the agreement is commanded by
their government.265 In such circumstances, they are entitled to
what is known as a "foreign sovereign compulsion" defense. 66
Yet, the use of the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine as a jus-
tification for actions which are affirmatively sought out by the U.S.
government reveals the hollowness and basic hypocrisy of the U.S.
law. In terms, the United States law says that a VRA among for-
eign producers is per se illegal under Section one of the Sherman
259. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (West Supp. 1995).
260. See, e.g., the report of Carla Hills, the Bush Administration's U.S. Trade Representative
negotiating an extension of the VRAs on steel with 29 countries in Japan Pledges Cooperation on
Steel Quota, EC Issues Measured Preliminary Reaction, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1010 (Aug.
2, 1989).
261. See infra text at notes 275-76 regarding standards governing VRAs and orderly marketing
agreements.
262. Market division agreements are illegal per se under the Sherman Act. See supra note 174.
263. PRESTOWITZ, supra note 28, at 421-23 (describing the mechanics of the Japanese VRA on
automobiles).
264. Prestowitz, however, recounts how an understanding that he had reached with MITI in
1982 over alleged dumping of semiconductor chips was undermined when the U.S. Department of
Justice threatened antitrust action against the Japanese producers. Id. at 151.
265. Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at 411 & n.97.
266. Id. at 413 & n.1 11; see Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293
(3d Cir. 1979) (explaining that the "defense is not principally concerned with the validity or
legality of the foreign government's order," but rather with whether it compelled the defendant
business to violate American antitrust law).
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Act,26 7 and is only immunized because the producers adhering to
the agreement have been coerced by their own government.268 Yet,
if the VRA is actively sought out by the U.S. government, the justi-
fication for exempting the VRA from the U.S. antitrust law ought
to be an explicitly acknowledged U.S. economic policy.
Indeed, even when the International Trade Commission recom-
mends relief to a distressed domestic industry under section 201, the
standards under which the Commission acts focus heavily upon the
current unprofitability of the industry, its idle capacity, its decline in
sales or market share, its inability to generate capital, and other
negative factors affecting the industry. 69 The statute is vastly less
clear on the need for the Commission to identify a plan for the in-
dustry to recover. The House Conference Report on the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 reported that the conferees
decided to make the submission of an adjustment plan by the peti-
tioning industry optional, although the conferees asserted their be-
lief "that it is important for firms and workers in the petitioning
industry to demonstrate to the ITC and the President what steps
they will be taking to make a positive adjustment to import competi-
tion."2 70 Thus, although the statute requires the ITC to make find-
ings on the distressed state of the industry, there is no specific re-
quirement for the industry to explain how it will use temporary
import relief to restore its competitiveness.271
D. The Use of VRA's and Similar Agreements
VRA's are used as means of forestalling antidumping actions. 172
Their close cousin, the orderly marketing agreement,273 is used as a
267. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
268. See supra note 266 and accompanying text (discussing the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense).
269. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (listing factors).
270. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 663 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1696.
271. See id. at 665, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1698 ("In order to assist the President
with his relief determination, the ITC is required to investigate and report on efforts made by
firms and workers to compete more effectively with imports.").
272. See Protecting Steel, supra note 190, at 873 (describing how when steel imports increased
during the late 1960's, the U.S. negotiated VRA's instead of relying on antidumping laws, or
legislative quotas).
273. An orderly marketing agreement is a form of protectionism which limits importation of
items into the U.S. See Michael S. Knoll, Perchance to Dream: The Global Economy and the
American Dream, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1606-09 (1993) (discussing various methods for re-
stricting imports including the imposition of orderly marketing agreements). One example is the
1995] 1089
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
substitute for action under the safeguards provisions contained in
section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act."" ' There are no statutory or
other standards governing the negotiation of a VRA, and hence offi-
cial accountability for their use is reduced to a minimum. Although
there are nominal standards governing orderly marketing agree-
ments, 27 5 their employment in fact is highly discretionary, partly
due to the wide ranging balancing act which the statute contem-
plates. 78 In addition to the attractiveness of VRA's and orderly
marketing agreements resulting from the legally unconstrained dis-
cretion attaching to their use, VRA's are attractive to policymakers
because their manner of providing trade relief confers a benefit to
the partially-excluded foreign producers in the form of higher unit
profits, a benefit which reduces the resistance of the affected foreign
nations to the exclusion. Finally, as noted above, VRA's are espe-
cially attractive to American policymakers because VRA's possess a
Janus-like quality: they are effective in barring imports while per-
mitting American officials to avoid responsibility for this interfer-
ence with open markets. 77 When VRA's take the form of agree-
ments essentially among foreign producers (as in the case of the
Japanese auto VRA), American officials are able to minimize their
own responsibility for the interference. Even government-to-govern-
ment agreements obscure the costs (which are off-budget) and
hence the full impact of these restraints.
VI. DUMPING AND RELATED ISSUES FROM 1916 TO 1995
Perhaps the most scandalous incoherence in U.S. economic policy
involves the relation between the antidumping laws and the antitrust
laws, a statutory and administrative contradiction which has existed
since 1921. The increasing use of the antidumping laws in the last
quarter-century, however, has heightened the policy conflict.
The first American antidumping law was enacted in 1916 and
Multi-Fiber Arrangement, which limits textile imports. Id. at 1607 n.39 (citation omitted).
274. See 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(3)(E) (West Supp. 1995) (stating that the President may "nego-
tiate, conclude, and carry out orderly marketing agreements with foreign countries limiting the
export from foreign countries and the import into the United States of such article").
275. See id. § 2253(a)(2) (listing factors the President may consider when determining whether
to grant import relief).
276. Id. § 2253(a).
277. See supra notes 239-52 and accompanying text (connecting the VRA problem with avoid-
ance of responsibility by U.S. policymakers).
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was cast as an antitrust law. 8 Its focus was upon predatory price
discrimination in international trade much as an analogous provision
of the Clayton Act had focused upon predatory price discrimination
in domestic trade two years earlier.27 9 The Act applied to sales by
foreign producers in the United States at prices below those prevail-
ing in the sellers' home market when the sales were motivated by a
predatory intent.28 °
In 1921, Congress enacted the antidumping legislation which has
formed an important core of U.S. trade law. 8' In modified form,
that law continues to this day.282 Although the background of the
1921 legislation, as well as its phrasing and structure, provide sup-
port for the view that the 1921 legislation, like its 1916 predecessor,
was aimed primarily at predatory pricing, 83 it has not been con-
strued or administered in that way. Indeed, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade has ratified the standard administrative practice by re-
jecting the contention that the 1921 legislation targets only
predatory pricing.28 '
In 1974 Congress broadened the scope of the antidumping law by
targeting sales of foreign producers at prices which were below cost
as well as sales in the United States at prices below home market
prices.286 This was accomplished by requiring foreign sales at less
than cost be disregarded for purposes of determining foreign market
value.88 Moreover, Congress established a constructed value of im-
ported merchandise in the 1974 legislation which includes (in addi-
tion to the costs of raw material, fabrication and packaging) an im-
puted additional ten percent for general expenses and an imputed
278. The Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988).
279. Gifford, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 292-93.
280. The Antidumping Act of 1916, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1988); see Gifford, Rethinking, supra
note 8, at 291-93 (discussing this Act).
281. Antidumping Act of 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (1921) (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. 160) (repealed 1979). The provisions of the 1921 Act were reenacted in substantial part in
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 106, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93
Stat. 144. See Wood, "Unfair" Trade Injury, supra note 13, at 1156-57 (discussing the An-
tidumping Act of 1921).
282. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671-1677k (1988)).
283. Gifford, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 293-96.
284. Trent Tube Div. v. United States, 741 F. Supp. 921, 926-27 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1990); USX
Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 68 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
285. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (West Supp. 1995).
286. Id.
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eight percent for profit. 87 As a result, foreign producers can be sell-
ing at nondiscriminatory and profit-generating prices and still be
selling at prices which are below "fair value" under U.S. law. 8
The result of the cumulative modifications of the antidumping
legislation, its administration and its judicial interpretation is that
the U.S. antidumping law is widely regarded as highly protection-
ist.2 89 It is designed to protect American producers from price com-
petition which by most standards is both efficient and fair.2 90 This,
of course, is an anticompetitive result, a result which is at odds with
the efficiency goals of the antitrust laws291 and at odds with most
official statements about the goals of U.S. trade policy. 92
The premises of antidumping legislation are anachronistic, espe-
cially in an increasingly global economy. The traditional belief was
that antidumping legislation protected American industry from "un-
fair" foreign competition.2 98 The traditional model of "unfair" for-
eign competition involved a foreign cartel which maintained monop-
oly prices in its protected home market while selling at marginal-
cost prices abroad. 94 This state of affairs was said to be unfair be-
cause it resulted from cartel (or cartel-like) behavior in protected
foreign markets. 95 Whatever might be said about the "unfairness"
of this kind of import competition, the antidumping laws could pro-
287. Id. §§ 1677b(e)(1)(B)(i), (ii).
288. The effect of the 1974 amendments is to deem foreign market value to be the higher of a
statutorily defined "cost" or foreign sales price. The antidumping act treats dumping as consisting
in selling in the United States below "fair value." 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (West Supp. 1995); id.
§ 1673d(a) (1988 & West Supp. 1995). "Fair value" is not defined in the act, but is equated with
an estimate of foreign market value in the regulations. 19 C.F.R. § 353.42(a) (1994). The statu-
tory definition of foreign market value, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (West Supp. 1995), is further elabo-
rated in the regulations. 19 C.F.R. § 353.46 (1994). The duty, if imposed, is the difference be-
tween the United States price and the foreign market value. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (West Supp. 1995).
289. See, e.g., Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in The United
States With Implications for International Trade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH, J. INT'L L. & ECON.
539, 560 (1993) (describing that the antidumping laws as protectionist).
290. "There is a widespread view among international trade experts that the purpose of the
antidumping duties imposed by the United States is to protect domestic industries from competi-
tion." Robert W. McGee & Yeomin Yoon, Technical Flaws in the Application of the U.S. An-
tidumping Law: The Experience of U.S-Korean Trade, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 259, 260 (1994)
(citation omitted).
291. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (stating that the goal of antitrust is to maxi-
mize efficiency).
292. See supra notes 31-51, 58-60 and accompanying text (discussing various official positions
of the U.S. Trade Representative).
293. Gifford, Rethinking, supra note 8, at 295-306.
294. Id. at 299-301.
295. Id.
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vide effective relief only if the market for the affected U.S. produc-
ers lay primarily in the United States. Indeed, unless the market for
the customers of the affected U.S. firms also lay primarily in the
United States, the law would not work.
In an era when U.S. producers are increasingly involved in the
export trade, existing antidumping legislation is outmoded. It is out-
moded because the relief it provides is ineffective. Indeed, it is worse
than ineffective. It penalizes efficient U.S. producers who purchase
inputs from the protected industry. Antidumping legislation works
to make the United States a "high-price island," insulated from
lower world-market prices.296 Producers in the protected industry
cannot effectively export in such circumstances and their producer-
customers are disadvantaged in their own export trade as a result.
The consequence is perverse. When antidumping duties were im-
posed upon flat-screen imports, most companies producing notebook
computers in the United States were forced to relocate abroad in
order to avoid the excess costs which were imposed by the duties on
the screens.2 97 This brings us full circle. The antidumping laws
themselves have forced the exit of this sector of an American
industry.
Finally, it is no secret that the antidumping laws do not operate
as they were originally intended. They are capable of imposing sub-
stantial costs upon foreign suppliers, but they generally cannot save
an industry which is no longer competitive.2 98 Academics are not the
only ones who are aware of the ineffectiveness of the antidumping
laws. The leaders of industry are also aware of their ineffectiveness
for the purposes for which they were intended.299 They have two
uses: First, antidumping laws are useful as bargaining chips. The
threat of an antidumping proceeding (or an actual proceeding) may
engender a willingness by foreign producers to enter into a VRA. 800
296. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining how protection over an input
makes a nation "a high-price island").
297. See T.R. Reid, Bonehead Play; The Commerce Department's Decision to Shore Up One
U.S. Industry at the Expense of Another Will Cost America Jobs, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1991, at
C7 (criticizing the Bush administration's imposition of an antidumping tariff on laptop computer
screens).
298. See supra notes 297 and accompanying text (describing how the imposition of antidump-
ing duties actually eliminated an American industry).
299. But see U.S. Steel Producers Urge No Weakening of Dumping, Subsidy Laws, 10 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 17, at 691 (Apr. 28, 1993) (quoting the chairman and chief executive of
Bethlehem Steel Corporation as insisting on enforcement of antidumping laws "to the letter").
300. The antidumping law contemplates such agreements in 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a)(2) (West
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On several notable occasions, actual or threatened antidumping pro-
ceedings have resulted in VRA's.301 As a result, antidumping legis-
lation has become a principal means of establishing an international
cartel.
Second, antidumping proceedings may perform the role of a
"safeguards" provision, providing temporary relief while a domestic
industry which has lost its competitiveness exits the market. 02 This
"safeguards" role for the antidumping law, however, is one which is
not widely acknowledged, especially by policymakers. Even in this
latter role, antidumping proceedings generally are employed instru-
mentally as bargaining devices for securing VRA's.
In short, U.S. antidumping law embodies anticompetitive policies
which are at odds with antitrust goals and at odds with official state-
ments about U.S. trade goals. Yet U.S. officials and lawmakers
rarely, if ever, attempt to reconcile these conflicting policies. Indeed,
policymakers not only fail to acknowledge publicly the conflict be-
tween antidumping law and antitrust law; they fail even to acknowl-
edge the basic ineffectiveness of antidumping law.
CONCLUSION
In the preceding pages, I have reviewed some of the more flagrant
contradictions in United States economic policies. These contradic-
tions exist partly because powerful interest groups add their weight
to the difficulties encountered by legislators and policymakers in
dealing with complex and controversial issues in an open society.
The particular structure of the United States government, involving,
as it does, two houses of Congress and the President in the enact-
ment of legislation immensely slows legislative reform.
For much of the post-World War II period, foreign trade was not
a matter of major national saliency. During the last twenty-five
years, however, it has become increasingly important. When Ameri-
can producers neglected the export market and faced little competi-
tion from abroad, the contradictions in official policy could be ig-
nored. Now that the contribution of international trade to American
Supp. 1995). It also contemplates agreements by the exporters to raise price. Id. §§ 1673c(b)(2),
(c).
301. Yvonne C. Schroeder, A Review of Selected 1988 International Trade Cases of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 1191, 1208 (1989)
(discussing the steel plate VRA with the Republic of Korea); see Schoenbaum, supra note 226, at
410 (discussing cases that are "too hot to handle as ordinary antidumping or section 201 cases.").
302. See supra notes 232-38 and accompanying text (discussing the "safeguards" provision).
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well-being has grown to a level of major importance, we can no
longer tolerate these policy contradictions. A coherent policy stance
is essential for American well-being as well as for the continued le-
gitimacy of our institutions.
The challenge for the United States is to formulate a set of eco-
nomic policies which will maximize U.S. wealth over the long term.
Indeed, the United States ought to test every one of its policies by
that standard. Were such an approach adopted, the antidumping
and other trade laws would be radically revised and the present cha-
otic state of U.S. policies would be made coherent and orderly.
Moreover, global welfare would be enhanced as the United States
eliminated inefficiencies and misallocations.
The focus should be on national welfare enhancement, because
the policy initiative is a national one. Moreover, national welfare
enhancement is a relatively clear goal, which policy makers can un-
derstand. The adoption of such an overall goal would dispel the
myths presently obscuring American policies to policymakers them-
selves as well as to the people. A clear goal such as the one proposed
would do for trade what the recognition of efficiency goals did for
U.S. antitrust law: it simplified the law, made it more predictable,
and eliminated the opportunity for judges unwittingly to inject their
own personal biases into their decisions. Were national welfare en-
hancement to become widely accepted as the purpose of trade, then
the Congress would have a vastly better guide to legislation than the
poorly defined "fairness" concepts which presently appear to guide
it. And when built into the law being administrated, the administer-
ing officials would have a kind of guidance which they now lack, and
the legitimacy of their decisions would be enhanced.
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